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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
McKEE, Chief Judge. 
 This case is before us on remand from the United 
States Supreme Court.  The City of Hazleton previously 
appealed the District Court‟s judgment permanently enjoining 
enforcement of two Hazleton ordinances that attempt to 
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prohibit employment of unauthorized aliens and preclude 
them from renting housing within the City.
1
  In a precedential 
Opinion and Judgment filed on September 9, 2010, we upheld 
the permanent injunction.  Thereafter, the Supreme Court 
granted Hazleton‟s petition for a writ of certiorari and 
remanded this case so that we could reconsider our analysis in 
light of Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 563 U.S. __, 131 
S. Ct. 1968 (2011).  See City of Hazleton v. Lozano, 563 U.S. 
__, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011).  Subsequently, the Court also 
decided Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 
2492 (2012).  Both Whiting and Arizona address the extent to 
which federal immigration law pre-empts various state laws 
pertaining to the treatment of unauthorized aliens.  On 
remand, we asked for supplemental briefing on whether either 
of those decisions alter our original analysis upholding the 
District Court‟s injunction. 
 
 Having thoroughly considered the additional 
submissions of the parties and the Court‟s decisions in 
Whiting and Arizona, we again conclude that both the 
employment and housing provisions of the Hazleton 
ordinances are pre-empted by federal immigration law.  
Accordingly, we will again affirm the District Court‟s order 
enjoining enforcement of these provisions. 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
The factual and procedural background underlying this 
case have been extensively described in the District Court‟s 
decision, Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477 
(M.D. Pa. 2007) (“Lozano I”), and our earlier decision, 
Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(“Lozano II”), vacated and remanded, 131 S. Ct. 2958 
                                                 
1
  For reasons explained in Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 
620 F.3d 170, 176 n.1 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Lozano II”), vacated 
and remanded, 563 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011), we will 
use the term “unauthorized alien” when discussing issues of 
employment, and we will use either “aliens not lawfully 
present” or “aliens lacking lawful immigration status” when 
referring to persons who are not legally in this country. 
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(2011).  Accordingly, we need not reiterate that history as 
thoroughly as we otherwise would.  However, context and 
clarity require that we first set forth those facts underlying our 
analysis on remand.  
 
This litigation involves a series of immigration 
ordinances enacted by the City of Hazleton between July 
2006 and March 2007.  The two ordinances at issue are:  (1) 
the Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance (“IIRAO”), 
which consists of Ordinance 2006-18, as amended by 
Ordinance 2006-40, and Ordinance 2007-6; and (2) the Rental 
Registration Ordinance (“RO”), which consists of Ordinance 
2006-13.
2
  These ordinances attempt to regulate the 
employment of unauthorized aliens, and the provision of 
rental housing to aliens lacking lawful immigration status, 
within Hazleton.     
 
The relevant employment provisions make it unlawful 
for any person “to knowingly recruit, hire for employment, or 
continue to employ, or to permit, dispatch, or instruct” any 
person without work authorization “to perform work in whole 
or in part within the City.”  IIRAO § 4A.  The IIRAO also 
provides for public monitoring and prosecution, and sanctions 
violators by suspending their business permits.  Id. § 4B.  
“Safe harbor” from the IIRAO‟s sanctions is available for 
businesses that verify work authorization using the federal E-
Verify program.  Id. § 4B(5).
3
  The IIRAO also requires City 
                                                 
2
  The full text of the IIRAO and RO are set forth as an 
Appendix to Lozano II, 620 F.3d at 224-38.  For convenience, 
we again attach the full text of these ordinances as an 
Appendix to this opinion. 
3
  “E-Verify is an internet-based system that allows an 
employer to verify an employee‟s work-authorization status.  
An employer submits a request to the E-Verify system based 
on information that the employee provides. . . . In response to 
that request, the employer receives either a confirmation or a 
tentative nonconfirmation of the employee‟s authorization to 
work.”  Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 
1975 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  
For a more complete description of the E-Verify program, 
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agencies and certain businesses to enroll in the E-Verify 
program.  Id. §§ 4B(6)(b), 4C, 4D.  
 
The disputed housing provisions are found in both the 
IIRAO and the RO.  The IIRAO makes legal immigration 
status a condition precedent to entering into a valid lease.  Id. 
§ 7B.  The IIRAO also provides that it is “unlawful for any 
person or business entity that owns a dwelling unit in the City 
to harbor an illegal alien in the dwelling unit, knowing or in 
reckless disregard of the fact that an alien” is unauthorized.  
Id. § 5A.  “Harboring” is broadly defined to include “let[ting], 
leas[ing], or rent[ing] a dwelling unit to an illegal alien.”  Id. 
§ 5A(1).   
 
The anti-harboring provisions in the IIRAO operate in 
conjunction with the rental registration scheme established in 
the RO.  The RO requires that prospective occupants of rental 
housing over the age of eighteen obtain an occupancy permit.  
RO §§ 1m, 6a, 7b.  The application for an occupancy permit 
requires submission of “[p]roper identification showing proof 
of legal citizenship and/or residency.”  Id. § 7b(1)(g).  
Landlords are prohibited from allowing anyone over the age 
of eighteen to rent or occupy a rental unit without an 
occupancy permit.  Id. § 6a.  Violators are subject to fines and 
possible imprisonment.  RO § 10.   
 
As explained in Lozano II, numerous plaintiffs sued 
alleging the ordinances were invalid and the District Court 
permanently enjoined enforcement of the ordinances after a 
two-week bench trial.  The court concluded that the 
ordinances are pre-empted by federal law and contrary to the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981, as well as a number of state laws limiting the 
authority of municipalities in Pennsylvania.  See Lozano II, 
620 F.3d at 181.
4
 
                                                                                                             
including its evolution and history, see Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 
1986. 
4
  The District Court dismissed Plaintiffs‟ Equal 
Protection, Fair Housing Act, privacy, and Pennsylvania 
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We thereafter affirmed the ultimate judgment of the 
District Court, although we differed in our reasoning.
5
  In 
short, we held that the employment provisions in the IIRAO, 
though not expressly pre-empted, are conflict pre-empted 
because they stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of federal law.  Lozano II, 620 F.3d  210-19.  We 
also held that the housing provisions in the IIRAO and RO 
are invalid because they impermissibly “regulate 
immigration” and are both field and conflict pre-empted by 
federal immigration law.  Id. at 219-24.
6
 
 
As we noted at the outset, after we issued our decision 
in Lozano II, the Supreme Court granted the City‟s petition 
for a writ of certiorari, vacated our decision, and remanded 
for reconsideration in light of that Court‟s intervening 
decision in Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 
1968 (2011).  In Whiting, the Supreme Court affirmed the 
decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 
Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856 
                                                                                                             
Landlord and Tenant Act claims.  Those portions of the 
District Court‟s ruling were not appealed. 
5
  We first held that at least one Plaintiff had standing 
to challenge the employment and housing provisions of the 
Hazleton ordinances generally, but no Plaintiff had standing 
to challenge a severable private cause of action provision in 
the IIRAO.  Lozano II, 620 F.3d at 184-94.  We also held that 
certain Plaintiffs could proceed anonymously and that the 
confidentiality agreement between the parties did not violate 
8 U.S.C. § 1373(a).  Id. at 194-96.  In addition, we concluded 
that Hazleton had waived any issues of severability except 
with respect to the private cause of action provision.  Id. at 
182.  Hazleton did not seek review of these holdings in its 
petition for a writ of certiorari, and did not raise these issues 
in its supplemental briefing following remand.  Accordingly, 
these portions of our earlier decision are not at issue here.  
6
  Because we affirmed on pre-emption grounds, it was 
not necessary to reach the other grounds the District Court 
relied upon in imposing the injunction.  
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(9th Cir. 2009).  There, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit had upheld the Legal Arizona Workers Act against 
claims of express and implied pre-emption.  Chicanos Por La 
Causa, 558 F.3d at 866, 867.  After the decision in Whiting, 
the Supreme Court decided Arizona v. United States, 132 S. 
Ct. 2492 (2012).  There, the Court held that three of four 
challenged provisions of Arizona‟s immigration law, known 
as “S.B. 1070,” were pre-empted.  However, the Court 
overturned a preliminary injunction with respect to the fourth 
provision and remanded for additional fact finding.  
 
III.  DISCUSSION
7
 
 
The question before us on remand remains whether 
federal law pre-empts the employment and/or housing 
provisions of the Hazleton ordinances.   
 
As we explained in Lozano II, “[t]he pre-emption 
doctrine is a necessary outgrowth of the Supremacy Clause,” 
which “provides that the laws of the United States „shall be 
the supreme Law of the Land . . . any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.‟”  Lozano II, 620 F.3d at 203 (quoting U.S. 
Const. art. VI, cl. 2).  Pre-emption may be either express or 
implied, and implied pre-emption includes both field pre-
emption and conflict pre-emption.  Gade v. Nat’l Solid 
Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992).  
 
 Field pre-emption occurs “[w]hen Congress intends 
federal law to „occupy the field.‟”  Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign 
Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000).  “The intent to 
displace state law altogether can be inferred from a 
framework of regulation „so pervasive . . . that Congress left 
no room for the States to supplement it‟ or where there is a 
                                                 
7
  The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review a district court‟s conclusions of 
law de novo and its factual findings for clear error.  See, e.g., 
McCutcheon v. America’s Servicing Co., 560 F.3d 143, 147 
(3d Cir. 2009).  
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„federal interest . . . so dominant that the federal system will 
be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same 
subject.‟”  Arizona v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2492, 2501 
(2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  To 
determine the boundaries that Congress sought to occupy 
within the field, “„we look to the federal statute itself, read in 
the light of its constitutional setting and its legislative 
history.‟”  De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 360 n.8 (1976) 
(quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 78-79 (1941) 
(Stone, J., dissenting)), superseded by statute on other 
grounds as stated in Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1974-75.   
 
Conflict pre-emption can occur in one of two ways:  
where “compliance with both federal and state regulations is a 
physical impossibility,” or “where the challenged state law 
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of 
the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”  Arizona, 131 
S. Ct. at 2501 (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted).  Courts must utilize their judgment to determine 
what constitutes an unconstitutional impediment to federal 
law, and that judgment is “informed by examining the federal 
statute as a whole and identifying its purpose and intended 
effects.”  Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373. 
 
Nothing the Court said in Whiting or Arizona altered 
this framework for pre-emption analysis.  The Court, did, 
however provide important guidance for our application of 
the pre-emption doctrine to the Hazleton ordinances.  The 
Court upheld Arizona‟s efforts to regulate the employment of 
unauthorized aliens through a business licensing law in 
Whiting, but largely rejected Arizona‟s efforts to enact its 
own immigration policies, both within and outside of the 
employment context, in Arizona.  With those cases as our 
compass, we now reconsider our prior ruling upholding the 
District Court‟s permanent injunction. 
A. The Employment Provisions 
The relevant employment provisions of the IIRAO 
regulate and prohibit a broad range of economic interactions 
with unauthorized aliens.  Section 4 of the IIRAO renders it 
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“unlawful for any business entity to knowingly recruit, hire 
for employment, or continue to employ, or to permit, 
dispatch, or instruct” any person without work authorization 
“to perform work in whole or in part within the City.”  IIRAO 
§ 4A.  “Work” is defined to include “any job, task, 
employment, labor, personal services, or any other activity for 
which compensation is provided, expected, or due, including 
but not limited to all activities conducted by business 
entities.”  Id. § 3F.  The IIRAO‟s prohibitions also apply to 
any “agreement to perform any service or work or to provide 
a certain product in exchange for valuable consideration.”  Id. 
§ 3C.  “Every business entity that applies for a business 
permit” must “sign an affidavit . . . affirming that they do not 
knowingly utilize the services of or hire any person who is an 
unlawful worker.”  Id. § 4A.    
 
Any City resident may submit a complaint to 
Hazleton‟s Code Enforcement Office (“HCEO”) alleging a 
violation of the employment provisions.  Id. § 4B(1).  Upon 
receipt of such a complaint, the HCEO requests identifying 
information about the alleged unlawful worker from the 
employing or contracting business entity.  That business 
entity must then provide the requested information within 
three business days, or Hazleton will suspend its business 
license.  Id. § 4B(3).  The HCEO then submits the identity 
information to the federal government, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 
1373, for verification of “the immigration status of such 
person(s).”  Id.8  
                                                 
8
  8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) provides:  
Notwithstanding any other provision of 
Federal, State, or local law, a Federal, 
State, or local government entity or 
official may not prohibit, or in any way 
restrict, any government entity or official 
from sending to, or receiving from, the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service 
information regarding the citizenship or 
immigration status, lawful or unlawful, 
of any individual. 
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If the HCEO confirms that the worker lacks 
authorization to work in the United States, the business must 
terminate that worker within three business days or the City 
will suspend its business license.  Id. § 4B(4).  A business 
whose license has been suspended under the IIRAO regains 
its license one business day after it submits an affidavit 
affirming that it has terminated the unauthorized worker.  Id. 
§ 4B(6).  After a second or subsequent violation of the 
IIRAO, Hazleton suspends the business‟s license for a 
minimum of twenty days and reports the violation to the 
federal government.  Id. § 4B(7).   
 
Safe harbor from the IIRAO‟s sanctions is available 
for businesses that verify the work authorization of their 
workers using the federal E-Verify program.  Id. § 4B(5).  In 
addition, the IIRAO requires that City agencies and 
businesses that contract with the City for amounts greater 
than $10,000 must enroll in E-Verify.  Id. §§ 4C, 4D.  Those 
business entities found to have utilized the work of two or 
more unlawful workers at one time must enroll in E-Verify in 
order to recover their license.  Id. § 4B(6)(b).  
 
We previously held that the IIRAO‟s employment 
provisions, though not expressly pre-empted, are conflict pre-
empted.  Lozano II, 620 F.3d  210-19.  However, in Chamber 
of Commerce v. Whiting, 132 S. Ct. 1968 (2011), the Supreme 
Court upheld an Arizona statute that allowed state courts to 
suspend or revoke the business licenses of employers who 
knowingly or intentionally employ unauthorized aliens and 
required that all Arizona employers use E-Verify.  
Accordingly, we will first consider whether our analysis in 
Lozano II, concluding that the IIRAO conflicts with federal 
law, survives Whiting.   
 
In Whiting, the Supreme Court considered whether the 
employer sanctions provisions of the Legal Arizona Workers 
Act (“LAWA”) were pre-empted by the Immigration Reform 
and Control Act of 1986 (“IRCA”), Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 
Stat. 3359 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a-1324b).  The Court 
held that those provisions were not expressly pre-empted 
because they fell “squarely” within the confines of IRCA‟s 
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savings clause.  That provision of IRCA “expressly preempts 
States from imposing „civil or criminal sanctions‟ on those 
who employ unauthorized aliens, „other than through 
licensing and similar laws.‟”  Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1977 
(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2)) (emphasis added).
9
  The 
Court also held that Arizona‟s licensing law did not conflict 
with federal law, and therefore was not impliedly pre-empted.  
Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1981-85.  The Court noted that the 
Arizona statute “simply implement[ed] the sanctions that 
Congress expressly allowed Arizona to pursue through 
licensing laws,” and “Arizona went the extra mile in ensuring 
that its law closely tracks IRCA‟s provisions in all material 
respects.”  Id. at 1981.10   
The Court in Whiting also held that the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
                                                 
9
  This part of the decision in Whiting is consistent 
with our analysis in Lozano II.  There, we held that the 
employment provisions in the IIRAO were not expressly pre-
empted because they constituted a “licensing [or] similar 
law[],” exempted from express pre-emption under 8 U.S.C. § 
1324a(h)(2).  Lozano II, 620 F.3d at 207-10.  Like Arizona‟s 
licensing law, the employment provisions here “fall[] . . . 
within the confines of the authority Congress chose to leave 
to the States and therefore is not expressly preempted.”  
Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1981. 
10
  For example, the Arizona law: (i) “adopt[s] the 
federal definition of who qualifies as an „unauthorized 
alien‟”; (ii) “expressly provides that state investigators must 
verify the work authorization of an allegedly unauthorized 
alien with the Federal Government” and prohibits any 
independent state determination; (iii) like the federal law, 
prohibits “„knowingly‟ employing an unauthorized alien” and 
requires that the prohibition be interpreted consistently with 
federal laws; and (iv) “provides employers with the same 
affirmative defense for good-faith compliance with the I-9 
process as does the federal law” and provides employers “a 
rebuttable presumption of compliance with the law when they 
use E-Verify.”  Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1981-82.  We will 
describe the “I-9” verification process infra. 
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1996 (“IIRIRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) 
(codified as amended in various sections of 8 U.S.C.), which 
established the optional program now known as E-Verify, did 
not pre-empt Arizona‟s requirement that all employers use E-
Verify.  Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1985-86.  The Court reasoned 
that the IIRIRA provision setting up E-Verify “contains no 
language circumscribing state action,” id. at 1985, and 
Arizona‟s use of E-Verify “in no way obstructs achieving 
[Congress‟s] aims,” id. at 1986.   
 
The plurality opinion in Whiting rejected or otherwise 
undermined several aspects of our analysis in Lozano II 
insofar as we held that the IIRAO‟s employment provisions 
were conflict pre-empted.   
 
First,  Whiting contradicts our conclusion that the 
employment provisions in Hazleton‟s ordinance impede 
congressional objectives by creating a separate and 
independent process for determining whether an employer is 
guilty of employing unauthorized aliens.  Compare Whiting, 
131 S. Ct. at 1981 (rejecting the Chamber‟s argument that 
Congress intended the federal system to be exclusive and 
therefore any state system necessarily conflicts with federal 
law) with Lozano II, 620 F.3d at 213 (“The crux of this 
conflict . . . is rooted in the fact that Hazleton has established 
an alternate system at all.”).  Since Congress expressly 
allowed states to pursue sanctions through licensing laws, the 
Whiting plurality reasoned that “Congress did not intend to 
prevent the States from using appropriate tools to exercise 
that authority.”  Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1981.   
 
Second, in Lozano II, we reasoned that, by imposing 
additional sanctions on employers who hire unauthorized 
aliens without including an express anti-discrimination 
provision, the IIRAO would create “the exact situation that 
Congress feared: a system under which employers might 
quite rationally choose to err on the side of discriminating 
against job applicants they perceive to be foreign.”  Lozano 
II, 620 F.3d at 218.  However, the Whiting plurality rejected a 
similar argument.  Those Justices reasoned that LAWA did 
not displace IRCA‟s anti-discrimination provisions, and that 
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other federal and state laws provide “further protection . . . 
and strong incentive for employers not to discriminate.”  
Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1984.  Thus, the Court believed that, 
even without an express anti-discrimination provision in the 
state law, “[t]he most rational path for employers is to obey 
the law—both the law barring the employment of 
unauthorized aliens and the law prohibiting discrimination.”  
Id.  
Finally, the Whiting plurality undermined our 
reasoning in Lozano II to the extent that we found pre-
emption because the City‟s employment provisions “coerce[] 
[the] use of E-Verify.”  Lozano II, 620 F.3d at 214.  That 
conclusion is now foreclosed by Whiting‟s approval of 
Arizona‟s requirement that all employers use E-Verify.  
Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1985-86.  There, the Court concluded 
that the requirement does not conflict with the federal scheme 
because the consequences for failure to use E-Verify under 
both the Arizona law and federal law were the same: the 
employer forfeits an otherwise available rebuttable 
presumption of compliance.  Id.  The Court further reasoned 
that the requirement does not obstruct federal objectives 
because “the Federal Government has consistently expanded 
and encouraged the use of E-Verify.”  Id. at 1986.   
 
Nevertheless, Plaintiffs here argue that even after 
Whiting, Hazleton‟s employment provisions remain impliedly 
pre-empted.  Plaintiffs point first to the fact that the IIRAO‟s 
restrictions apply to a much broader range of actors and 
activities than Congress intended under IRCA.  According to 
Plaintiffs, this basis for our prior finding of conflict pre-
emption was not disturbed by Whiting.  We agree.   
 
Section 4 of the IIRAO makes it “unlawful for any 
business entity to knowingly recruit, hire for employment, or 
continue to employ, or to permit, dispatch, or instruct any 
person who is an unlawful worker to perform work . . . within 
the City.”  IIRAO § 4A.  The IIRAO defines “business entity” 
to include any person “engaging in any activity, enterprise, 
profession, or occupation for gain, benefit, advantage, or 
livelihood, whether for profit or not for profit.”  Id. § 3A.  
The term specifically includes “self-employed individuals, 
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partnerships, corporations, contractors,
11
 and subcontractors,”  
Id. § 3A(1), and any entity that “possesses a business permit, . 
. . is exempt from obtaining such a business permit, . . . [or] is 
operating unlawfully without such a business permit.” Id. § 
3A(2).   
 
In sharp contrast to the IIRAO, the federal prohibition 
in IRCA reaches only “hir[ing]” or “recruit[ing] or refer[ring] 
for a fee, for employment in the United States.”  8 U.S.C. § 
1324a(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added).  In striking the intricate 
balance that lead to the enactment of IRCA, Congress 
deliberately excluded independent contractors and other non-
employees from the scope of the restrictions contained in the 
statute.  Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2504. (“Congress enacted 
IRCA as a comprehensive framework for „combating the 
employment of illegal aliens.‟”) (emphasis added) (quoting 
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 
147 (2002)).  As we explained previously:   
 
In drafting IRCA, Congress explicitly 
declined to sanction employers based on 
the work authorization status of “casual 
hires (i.e., those that do not involve the 
existence of an employer/employee 
relationship).”  H.R. Rep. No. 99-682(I), 
[at 57], 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5661.  
This was not an unreasoned choice, but 
part of the crafting of the statute to 
minimize the burden placed on 
employers.  As the court explained in 
Edmondson, “[e]mployers are not 
required [under federal law] to verify the 
work eligibility of independent 
contractors” because it “would increase 
the burdens on business.”  594 F.3d at 
                                                 
11
  The term “contractor” is further defined to include 
any “person, employer, subcontractor or business entity that 
enters into an agreement to perform any service or work or to 
provide a certain product in exchange for valuable 
consideration.”  IIRAO § 3C.   
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767.  Businesses utilize independent 
contractors, in part, to reduce the costs 
and liabilities associated with procuring 
labor when an enduring and structured 
relationship is not needed.  Compelling 
businesses to concern themselves with 
the work authorization status of 
contractors alters this relationship, and 
also raises costs.   
  
Lozano II, 620 F.3d at 216-17 (alterations in original).   
 
Under IRCA, employers are not required to verify 
contractors‟ work eligibility, as they must with employees.  
See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(b) (requiring employers to verify work 
eligibility of employees); § 274a.1(f) (excluding “independent 
contractor” and “those engaged in casual domestic 
employment” from the definition of “employee”); id. § 
274a.1(g) (excluding those who use “contract labor” from the 
definition of “employer”).12  Given the intricate framework of 
IRCA, we cannot assume that the distinction is immaterial.  
Rather, it appears to be a deliberate distinction that Congress 
included as part of the balance it struck in determining the 
scope and impact of IRCA‟s employer sanctions.  However, 
Hazleton‟s ordinance does not distinguish between 
employees, on the one hand, and independent contractors or 
                                                 
12
  Employers are, however, liable for knowingly 
utilizing the services of independent contractors who lack 
work authorization.  8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(4) (“[A] person or 
other entity who uses a contract, subcontract, or exchange . . . 
to obtain the labor of an alien . . . knowing that the alien is an 
unauthorized alien . . . shall be considered to have hired the 
alien for employment . . . in violation of [8 U.S.C. § 
1324a](1)(A).”).  However, this provision does not undermine 
Congress‟s intent to restrict IRCA‟s applicability to the 
employer/employee context.  Rather, the purpose was to close 
a “loophole” so that employers may not use independent 
contractors to circumvent IRCA‟s prohibition on the 
employment of unauthorized workers.  See H.R. Rep. No. 99-
682(I), at 62, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5666. 
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casual hires, on the other.   
 
The breadth of the reach of the IIRAO‟s sanctions 
operates in tandem with the fact that the IIRAO provides a 
safe harbor only if “prior to the date of the violation, the 
business entity had verified the work authorization of the 
alleged unlawful worker(s)” using the E-Verify program.  
IIRAO § 4B(4).  Accordingly, the Hazleton scheme compels 
employers to verify the status of independent contractors and 
casual hires in order to obtain a safe harbor.  In Lozano II, we 
determined that although the IIRAO only coerces, without 
directly requiring, verification of non-employees‟ work 
authorization, the coercion is equally problematic for pre-
emption purposes because the IIRAO subjects employers to 
sanctions if those non-employees lack work authorization.  
Lozano II, 620 F.3d at 217.
13
   
                                                 
13
  The City argues that, in practice, the IIRAO would 
treat independent contractors in a manner similar to federal 
law under 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(4)—only those who knowingly 
use the services of contactors who lack work authorization 
would face sanctions.  For the reasons explained above, we 
disagree.  Further, the IIRAO‟s terms reach as far as union 
organizing activity and the activity of not for profit 
organizations that refer individuals for employment but 
without a fee or profit motive.  See  IIRAO § 3A, 4A.  Federal 
regulations specifically exclude “union hiring halls that refer 
union members or non-union individuals who pay union 
membership dues.”  8 C.F.R. § 274a.1(d)-(e); see also H.R. 
Rep. 99-682(I), at 57, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5660 (noting 
exception for unions and similar entities).  These “[f]ederal 
regulations have no less pre-emptive effect than federal 
statutes.”  Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 
U.S. 141, 153 (1982).  Moreover, as we will explain, in 
addition to reaching a broader range of actors, the IIRAO‟s 
employment provisions also sanction a broader range of 
activities than does IRCA.  Because the terms of the IIRAO 
sweep so broadly, even if we were to accept the City‟s 
position that the IIRAO and IRCA treat independent 
contractors similarly, it would not save the IIRAO from pre-
emption. 
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Moreover, we must assess the extraordinarily broad 
definition of the persons and entities covered by the IIRAO 
together with the equally broad definition of the activities 
covered by the IIRAO.  The IIRAO defines “work” to include 
“any job, task, employment, labor, personal services, or any 
other activity for which compensation is provided, expected, 
or due, including but not limited to all activities conducted by 
business entities.”  IIRAO § 3F.  The IIRAO‟s prohibitions 
also apply to any “agreement to perform any service or work 
or to provide a certain product in exchange for valuable 
consideration.”  Id. § 3C.  Moreover, there is no requirement 
that the alleged unauthorized work be performed at the 
location associated with an entity‟s business license, or even 
in connection with the activities for which an entity has a 
business license, for it to be considered a violation of the 
IIRAO.
14
  Thus, under a literal reading of the IIRAO, the 
HCEO may revoke the business license of any person or 
entity if, for example, s/he purchases used items at a yard sale 
from an unauthorized alien, buys a glass of lemonade from an 
undocumented child‟s lemonade stand, or pays an 
undocumented neighbor to mow her lawn—even if such 
conduct is entirely unrelated to the actor‟s licensed business 
activity.  
 
Indeed, it is difficult for us to conceive of any activity 
that is even remotely economic in nature, conducted by any 
person or entity in Hazleton, that would not be swept  into the 
broad expanse of the IIRAO.  We believe that prohibiting 
such a broad array of commercial interactions, based solely 
on immigration status, under the guise of a “business 
licensing” law is untenable in light of Congress‟s deliberate 
decision to limit IRCA‟s reach to the employer-employee 
relationship.    
 
Whiting is not to the contrary.  The City argues that the 
Court in Whiting was not troubled by the fact that Arizona‟s 
law applied to independent contractors.  However, the 
                                                 
14
  Rather, the IIRAO expressly states that “work” 
includes, but “is not limited to all activities conducted by 
business entities.”  IIRAO § 3F (emphasis added). 
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provisions to which the City refers were added as part of a 
2008 amendment to LAWA, and as the Supreme Court 
expressly noted, the 2008 amendments “were not part of the 
statute when [the] suit was brought, they are not before us and 
we do not address their interaction with federal law.”  
Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1986 n.10; see also Arizona 
Contractors Ass’n v. Candelaria, 534 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1053 
(D. Ariz. 2008) (“[L]ike IRCA, [LAWA‟s] restrictions apply 
only with respect to those persons who have an „employment 
relationship‟ with an employer, so it does not include casual 
hires.”), aff’d sub nom. Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. 
Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2009), aff’d sub nom., 
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011).   
 
Thus, unlike the IIRAO, the Arizona law upheld by the 
Supreme Court “closely track[ed] IRCA‟s provisions in all 
material respects,” Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1981, including 
IRCA‟s precisely tailored reach.15  Thus, Whiting alone does 
not support the proposition that an ordinance that diverges 
from federal law to the extent the IIRAO does is similarly 
sheltered from the reach of federal pre-emption.  
 
The Supreme Court‟s more recent decision in Arizona 
v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012), further undermines 
the contention that the IIRAO should be upheld as a protected 
business licensing law.  The Court in Arizona affirmed that 
“the existence of an express pre-emption provisio[n] does not 
bar the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption principles or 
impose a special burden that would make it more difficult to 
establish the preemption of laws falling outside the clause.”  
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2504-05 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted) (alteration in original).  Moreover, the 
Court‟s reasons for finding that § 5(C) of Arizona‟s S.B. 1070 
law conflicted with IRCA apply with equal force to the 
                                                 
15
  Indeed, the Court in Whiting noted that the Arizona 
law tracked the provisions of the federal law so tightly that if 
the Arizona law was pre-empted, “there really is no way for 
the State to implement licensing sanctions, contrary to the 
express terms of the savings clause.”  131 S. Ct. at 1987.  
That is clearly not the situation here with the IIRAO.  
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IIRAO‟s attempt to extend its regulations beyond the 
employer-employee relationship.  Section 5(C) of S.B. 1070 
made it a state crime to seek or engage in work without 
federal authorization.  In concluding that that provision was 
pre-empted, the Supreme Court stated, “Congress enacted 
IRCA as a comprehensive framework for „combating the 
employment of illegal aliens,‟” and IRCA, by design, “does 
not impose federal criminal sanctions on the employee side 
(i.e., penalties on aliens who seek or engage in unauthorized 
work).”  Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2504.  Thus, the Court 
concluded that “[a]lthough § 5(C) attempts to achieve one of 
the same goals as federal law—the deterrence of unlawful 
employment—it involves a conflict in the method of 
enforcement” and is therefore pre-empted.  Id. at 2505.  Just 
as purposely as Congress limited the scope of IRCA‟s 
coverage to exclude independent contractors, Hazleton 
purposely stretched the IIRAO to include them.  The result is 
a local ordinance that conflicts with Congress‟s intent to limit 
IRCA‟s application to the employer/employee relationship.  
See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2505 (“[A] „[c]onflict in technique 
can be fully as disruptive to the system Congress enacted as 
conflict in overt policy.‟” (citing Motor Coach Employees v. 
Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 287 (1971))).  Accordingly, like § 
5(C) of Arizona‟s S.B. 1070, the IIRAO employment 
provisions conflict with IRCA.   
 
In Lozano II, we also concluded that the IIRAO 
conflicts with IRCA because it does not provide an 
affirmative defense to employers who comply with the I-9 
process to verify immigration status.  Lozano II, 620 F.3d at 
214-15.
16
  Plaintiffs argue that this conclusion was also not 
                                                 
16
  The “I-9” process derives its name from the 
form that IRCA requires employers to complete.   
IRCA requires that employers . . . 
confirm an employee‟s authorization to 
work by reviewing the employee‟s 
United States passport, resident alien 
card, alien registration card, or other 
document approved by the Attorney 
General; or by reviewing a combination 
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disturbed by Whiting because the Arizona law at issue there 
provided a safe harbor for I-9 compliance.  Once again, we 
agree.  
As we have explained:  
 
Congress paid considerable attention to 
the costs IRCA would impose on 
employers, see e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 99-
682(I), at [90], 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 
5694 (“Considerable discussion was 
generated during the processing of [this 
bill] to the effect the employer sanctions 
provisions were placing an undue burden 
on employers in requiring them to do the 
paperwork and keep records on 
employees.”), and drafted the legislation 
in a manner that would minimize those 
burdens, see, e.g., 132 Cong. Rec. 
H10583-01 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1986) 
(statement of Rep. Bryant) (IRCA has 
been “carefully designed for the 
minimum burden necessary . . . to be 
effective.”).  
 
                                                                                                             
of other documents such as a driver‟s 
license and social security card.  § 
1324a(b)(1)(B)-(D).  The employer must 
attest under penalty of perjury on 
Department of Homeland Security Form 
I-9 that he “has verified that the 
individual is not an unauthorized alien” 
by reviewing these documents.  § 
1324a(b)(1)(A).  The form I-9 itself “and 
any information contained in or 
appended to [it] . . . may not be used for 
purposes other than for enforcement of” 
IRCA and other specified provisions of 
federal law.  § 1324a(b)(5). 
Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1974. 
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Lozano II, 620 F.3d 211.  As part of this effort, Congress 
created the I-9 process as a uniform federal system by which 
employers must verify the work authorization of new hires.  
Under IRCA, good-faith compliance with the I-9 process 
provides an employer with an affirmative defense if charged 
with a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324a.  8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(3); 
H.R. Rep. No. 99-682 (I), at 57.  However, Hazleton‟s 
scheme does not provide any safe harbor for employers who 
use the I-9 process.  The IIRAO‟s employment provisions 
thus contravene congressional intent for the I-9 process to 
serve as an acceptable way of protecting against sanctions and 
Congress‟s desire to avoid placing an undue burden on 
employers.  As we previously explained: 
 
By making the I-9 system a uniform 
national requirement, Congress limited 
the compliance burden on interstate 
corporations while facilitating uniform 
enforcement.  A uniform system reduces 
costs for employers with multiple 
locations throughout the country by 
ensuring that the same human resources 
procedures can be used in all locations.  
Hazleton‟s scheme denies interstate 
employers who use the I-9 process the 
benefits of uniformity.  Interstate 
employers with locations in Hazleton 
(who wish to ensure safe harbor in all 
locations) would either have to adhere to 
different regulations in different 
locations, or use E-Verify in all 
locations. 
 
Lozano II, 620 F.3d at 215 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).   
 
 Although the Supreme Court in Whiting upheld 
Arizona‟s requirement that all employers enroll in E-Verify, 
the Court‟s holding did not negate the importance of the I-9 
process to the federal scheme.  Rather, the Court‟s holding 
was based upon its conclusion that “the consequences of not 
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using E-Verify under the Arizona law are the same as . . . 
under the federal law,”  Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1985,17 and 
“[t]he Arizona law provides employers with the same 
affirmative defense for good-faith compliance with the I-9 
process as does the federal law,” id. at 1982.  Thus, although 
Arizona “required” employers to use E-Verify, that 
“requirement” was exactly the same as the federal law‟s 
treatment of E-Verify, and similarly, Arizona treated I-9 
compliance the same way that federal law treated I-9 
compliance. 
 
The City argues that the lack of an affirmative defense 
for I-9 compliance is irrelevant given the structure of the 
Hazleton scheme, which does not rely on a judicial process 
for proving that an employer knowingly hired an 
unauthorized alien and assessing a penalty.  In addition to 
highlighting procedural due process concerns, this assertion 
elevates form over function and misses the point.  The 
significance of the I-9 affirmative defense is the safe harbor it 
provides for employers.  We are therefore not impressed with 
a distinction between judicially imposed sanctions and 
                                                 
17
  Under both the Arizona and federal law, the only 
consequence of not using E-Verify is forfeiture of the 
otherwise available rebuttable presumption of compliance 
with the law.  Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1985-86.  As we 
explained, supra, the Supreme Court explicitly noted that, 
during the course of the litigation, Arizona had amended its 
statute.  The amendments included, inter alia, the attachment 
of “other consequences, such as the loss of state-allocated 
economic development incentives” to a failure to use E-
Verify.  Id. at 1986 n.10.  Because those amendments “were 
not part of the statute when [the] suit was brought,”  the Court 
was careful to explain that “they are not before us and we do 
not address their interaction with federal law.”  Id.  In this 
regard, we note that the IIRAO attaches an additional penalty 
to a failure to use E-Verify:  disqualification from city 
contracts greater than $10,000.  IIRAO § 4D.  This additional 
sanction for failure to use E-Verify goes beyond a mere 
licensing provision and is yet another reason the IIRAO 
conflicts with federal law.  
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administratively imposed sanctions.  The resulting impact on 
a given business appears indistinguishable. Whether a judicial 
officer or an administrator is charged with imposing sanctions 
is irrelevant.  The City insists that the drafters of Hazleton‟s 
ordinances attempted to construct a parallel regulatory 
scheme that would comply with IRCA‟s savings clause.  
However, the City‟s decision to omit a safe harbor for I-9 
compliance, while providing one for those who use E-Verify, 
see IIRAO § 4B(5), is not as inconsequential as the City 
would have us believe.    A scheme providing a safe harbor 
for both verification procedures would have been much closer 
to the parallel regulatory scheme that the Court upheld in 
Whiting.  Absent that, an important aspect of the federal 
scheme is undermined.  
 
Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 
(2000), further illustrates how Hazleton‟s disregard of the I-9 
process impedes federal objectives.  There, Alexis Geier 
suffered serious injuries when the Honda she was driving 
crashed into a tree.  She sued the auto company alleging that 
her injuries resulted from the absence of airbags, which she 
claimed was a design defect.  Id. at 865.  However, Geier‟s 
car had automatic belts and thus complied with applicable 
federal safety standards, which, rather than requiring airbags, 
“allow[ed] manufacturers to choose among different passive 
restraint mechanisms, such as airbags, automatic belts, or 
other passive restraint technologies.”  Id. at 878.  The 
applicable federal statute, however, also stated that 
“[c]ompliance with a federal safety standard does not exempt 
any person from liability under common law.”  Id. at 868 
(internal quotation marks omitted, bracket in original).  
Nonetheless, the manufacturer argued that the plaintiff‟s 
claim for damages was pre-empted by federal law.  The Court 
had to decide “whether the Act pre-empts a state common-
law tort action in which the plaintiff claims that the . . . 
manufacturer, who was in compliance with the standard, 
should nonetheless have equipped [her] automobile with 
airbags.”  Id. at 865.   
 
The Supreme Court held that the tort action conflicted 
with federal law and was thus pre-empted.  Id. at 874.  The 
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Court reasoned that federal regulations sought “a variety and 
mixture of [safety] devices” and “deliberately imposed” a 
“gradual passive restraint phase in.”  Id. at 881.  
Notwithstanding the savings clause, allowing the action to 
proceed when plaintiff‟s car complied with the applicable 
federal safety standard “would have stood „as an obstacle to 
the accomplishment and execution of‟ [those] important . . . 
federal objectives.”  Id. (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 67).  
Similarly, permitting Hazleton to impose sanctions on 
employers who have complied with, and relied upon, the I-9 
process would obstruct important federal objectives.  
Congress wanted to make the I-9 process available as a 
uniform means of protecting against such sanctions and 
minimizing the burden on employers.  See also Fid. Fed. Sav. 
& Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 156 (1982) 
(finding conflict pre-emption where state law limited the 
availability of due-on-sale provisions in loan instruments, 
which federal regulators deemed “essential to the economic 
soundness of the thrift industry”). 
 
The IIRAO‟s lack of procedural protections presents 
yet another “„obstacle to the accomplishment and execution 
of the full purposes and objectives‟” of federal law.  See 
Arizona, 131 S. Ct. at 2501 (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 67).  
The IIRAO provides substantially fewer procedural 
protections than IRCA, which circumscribed sanctions with a 
detailed hearing and adjudication procedure.  Under IRCA, 
only complaints with a “substantial probability of validity” 
are investigated.  8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(1)(B).  In contrast, 
under the IIRAO, any superficially valid complaint is 
investigated.  IIRAO §§ 4B(1), (3).  In addition, when 
enacting IRCA, Congress mandated that an employer be 
provided with notice and an opportunity for a hearing, 8 
U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(3)(A), and an administrative law judge 
must find the employer guilty of violating IRCA by a 
preponderance of the evidence before any sanctions can be 
imposed, id. § 1324a(e)(3)(C).  That employer also has a right 
to an administrative appeal and judicial review.  Id. § 
1324a(e)(7)-(8).  In marked contrast, the IIRAO requires the 
HCEO to immediately suspend the business license of any 
entity that fails to provide requested information about 
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alleged unlawful workers within three business days.  IIRAO 
§ 4B(3).
18
  If a business entity does not terminate an 
unauthorized worker within three days of being notified that 
the worker is not authorized, the City immediately suspends 
that entity‟s business license.  Id. § 4B(4).19  Thus, the 
burdens imposed on businesses under the Hazleton scheme 
are greater than those Congress elected to impose under the 
similar, but distinct approach of IRCA. 
 
The procedures in LAWA (the Arizona statute upheld 
in Whiting), substantially track the procedures Congress 
established under IRCA.  In contrast to the immediate 
suspension of business licenses authorized by the IIRAO, 
sanctions under LAWA, like under IRCA, could only be 
imposed after the attorney general or county attorney brings 
an enforcement action in state court.  A.R.S. § 23-212(D) 
(effective Sept. 19, 2007 to Apr. 30, 2008).  The state court 
was directed to provide a “hearing at the earliest practicable 
date,” id. § 22-212(E), and sanctions could only be imposed 
by the court after determining that there had been a violation, 
id. § 23-212(F).
20
   
 
Conversely, the lack of procedural protections in the 
IIRAO‟s employment provisions undermines the delicate 
balance Congress erected for enforcing the prohibition on 
hiring unauthorized aliens.  Congress was clearly concerned 
                                                 
18
  IIRAO § 4B(3) states:  the HCEO “shall suspend 
the business permit of any entity which fails, within three 
business days after receipt of the request [for identity 
information regarding alleged unlawful workers], to provide 
such information.”     
19
  IIRAO § 4B(4) provides that the HCEO “shall 
suspend the business permit of any business entity which fails 
[to] correct a violation of this section within three business 
days after notification of the violation by the [HCEO].” 
20
  See also Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. 
Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 868-69 (9th 2009) (describing 
procedures to be followed under LAWA and holding that 
LAWA provided adequate due process).   
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with avoiding undue burdens on employers.  See, e.g., H.R. 
Rep. No. 99-682(I), at 56 (describing desire for employer 
sanctions to be implemented in a manner that “would be the 
least disruptive to the American businessman”); S. Rep. No. 
99-132, at 35 (1985) (expressing concern regarding 
“harassment  . . . against innocent employers” and noting that 
“[s]pecific protections have been included to minimize the 
risk of these undesirable results”).  As the Supreme Court 
noted, “Congress did indeed seek to strike a balance among a 
variety of interests when it enacted IRCA.” Whiting, 131 S. 
Ct. at 1984.
21
  It is therefore apparent that the lack of minimal 
procedural protections in Hazleton‟s ordinance further 
undermines the express congressional objective of 
minimizing undue burdens on, and harassment of, employers.   
 
Accordingly, although the Court‟s recent decisions in 
Whiting and Arizona alter some of our previous analysis, 
neither opinion alters the outcome of this dispute.  For the 
reasons we have set forth above, we again hold that the 
employment provisions of the IIRAO are pre-empted because 
they “stand[] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution” of IRCA‟s objectives, Hines, 312 U.S. at 67, and 
were properly enjoined by the District Court.
22
  
                                                 
21
  The Court in Whiting concluded that a failure to 
include an express anti-discrimination provision was not fatal 
to Arizona‟s employer sanctions law and that the Arizona law 
did not otherwise upset the balance of interests that Congress 
intended.  Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1984.  However, nothing in 
Whiting undermines the conclusion that IRCA indeed 
represents a careful congressional balance of competing 
interests, including, inter alia, preventing undue burden on 
employers. 
22
  The City argues that the standard articulated in 
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), precludes a 
finding of pre-emption and that Arizona supports its position 
in this regard.  We disagree.  Although Justice Scalia‟s and 
Justice Alito‟s opinions in Arizona cite Salerno and espouse 
the City‟s approach,  see Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2515 (Scalia, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 2534 
(Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), no part of 
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B. The Housing Provisions 
The housing provisions at issue in this litigation are 
found in both the IIRAO and the RO.  The RO sets up a rental 
registration scheme that operates in conjunction with anti-
                                                                                                             
the majority opinion in Arizona, and no part of Whiting, 
references Salerno at all.  The plurality in Whiting and 
majority in Arizona did not adopt the approach the City asks 
us to adopt.  That approach would reject a conflict pre-
emption claim in a facial challenge whenever a defendant can 
conjure up just one hypothetical factual scenario in which 
implementation of the state law would not directly interfere 
with federal law.  Indeed, if this were the standard governing 
the Supreme Court‟s review of Arizona‟s S.B. 1070 law, 
many of the sources of conflict with federal law described by 
the Court would have been irrelevant to the Court‟s conflict 
pre-emption analysis.  For example, the Court in Arizona 
concluded that § 6, which authorized state and local police to 
arrest certain potentially removable individuals, conflicted 
with federal law in part because it interfered with federal 
enforcement discretion and could target and harass 
individuals the federal government does not seek to remove.  
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2506-07.  However, under the City‟s 
approach, this conflict is irrelevant in a facial challenge 
because, in at least some circumstances, the local police could 
be arresting individuals whom the federal government does 
want removed and whose arrest would not otherwise conflict 
with federal policy.  To the contrary, however, the Court in 
Arizona found this potential conflict consequential.   
The analysis of § 2(B) in Arizona also fails to support 
the City‟s position.  The Court vacated a preliminary 
injunction against § 2(B) and remanded for further fact  
finding because the provision, on its face, was ambiguous, 
and Arizona‟s courts may construe § 2(B) in a way that would 
preclude any unconstitutional applications of the law.  
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2509-10.  The Court, however, did not 
reject a facial challenge against the provision pursuant to the 
City‟s theory, i.e., because implementation of § 2(B), in some 
circumstances may be in harmony with federal law.     
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harboring provisions in the IIRAO to prohibit unauthorized 
aliens from residing in any rental housing within the City.   
 
The RO requires any prospective occupant of rental 
housing over the age of eighteen to apply for and receive an 
occupancy permit.  RO § 1m, 6a, 7b.  To receive the permit, 
the prospective occupant must pay a ten-dollar fee and submit 
certain basic information and “[p]roper identification showing 
proof of legal citizenship and/or residency” to the HCEO.  Id. 
§ 7b.  Landlords must inform all prospective occupants of this 
requirement, and landlords are prohibited from allowing 
anyone over the age of eighteen to rent or occupy a rental unit 
without registering with the City and receiving a permit.  Id. § 
6a, 7b.  A landlord found guilty of violating these 
requirements must pay an initial fine of $1000 per 
unauthorized occupant.  Id. § 10b.  That landlord is also 
subject to an additional fine of $100 per day, per unauthorized 
occupant, until the violation is corrected.  Authorized 
occupants of rental housing who allow anyone without an 
occupancy permit to reside with them are subject to the same 
fines.  Id. § 10c.  
 
As we mentioned earlier, the anti-harboring provisions 
in the IIRAO make legal immigration status a condition 
precedent to entering into a valid lease.  IIRAO § 7B.  A 
tenant lacking lawful status “who enters into such a contract 
shall be deemed to have breached a condition of the lease.”  
Id.  The IIRAO makes it “unlawful for any person or business 
entity that owns a dwelling unit in the City to harbor an 
illegal alien in the dwelling unit, knowing or in reckless 
disregard of the fact that an alien has come to, entered, or 
remains in the United States in violation of law.”  Id. § 5A.  
“Harboring” is broadly defined to include “let[ting], leas[ing], 
or rent[ing] a dwelling unit to an illegal alien.”  Id. § 5A(1).  
An “illegal alien” is defined as “an alien who is not lawfully 
present in the United States, according to the terms of United 
States Code Title 8, section 1101 et seq.”  Id. § 3D.   
 
We previously found the housing provisions in the 
IIRAO and the RO pre-empted on three separate pre-emption 
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grounds.
23
  No part of Whiting or Arizona considered 
provisions of a state or local ordinance that, like the housing 
provisions here, prohibit, and define “harboring” to include, 
allowing unauthorized aliens to reside in rental housing.  
Moreover, nothing in Whiting or Arizona undermines our 
analysis of the contested housing provisions here.  On the 
contrary, the Court‟s language reinforces our view that 
Hazleton‟s attempt to prohibit unauthorized aliens from 
renting dwelling units in the City are pre-empted.  
1. The Housing Provisions Constitute 
Impermissible Regulation of Immigration 
and Are Field Pre-empted. 
We begin this part of our analysis by noting that the 
Supreme Court was careful in Arizona to stress the important 
national interests that are implicated when local governments 
attempt to regulate immigration and the concomitant need to 
leave such regulation in the hands of the federal government. 
 
The federal power to determine immigration 
                                                 
23
  In Lozano II, we determined that the presumption against 
pre-emption applied to our analysis of the employment 
provisions, Lozano II, 620 F.3d at 206-07, but did not apply 
to our analysis of the housing provisions, id. at 219.  We find 
unpersuasive the City‟s argument that we erred in failing to 
apply the presumption to the housing provisions and see 
nothing in Arizona or Whiting suggesting otherwise.  The 
housing provisions attempt to regulate who may live within 
Hazleton based solely on immigration status.  In this area of 
“significant federal presence,” we will not apply the 
presumption against pre-emption.  See United States v. Locke, 
529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000); see also United States v. Alabama, 
691 F.3d 1269, 1296-97 (11th Cir. 2012) (concluding that 
state law prohibiting courts from recognizing contracts with 
aliens lacking lawful immigration status “constitutes a thinly 
veiled attempt to regulate immigration under the guise of 
contract law,” and thus, the presumption against pre-emption 
does not apply, but even if it does, the law is pre-empted), 
cert. denied, 569 U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2022 (2013).  
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policy is well settled. Immigration policy can 
affect trade, investment, tourism, and 
diplomatic relations for the entire Nation, as 
well as the perceptions and expectations of 
aliens in this country who seek the full 
protection of its laws.  
 
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2498.  In finding three of the four 
challenged provisions in Arizona pre-empted, the Court 
reiterated the primacy of the federal government‟s concern 
for the treatment and regulation of aliens in this country. 
 
In Lozano II, we held that the housing provisions 
impermissibly “regulate immigration” in contravention of the 
Supreme Court‟s pronouncement that a state or locality may 
not determine “„who should or should not be admitted into 
the country, and the conditions under which a legal entrant 
may remain.‟”  Lozano II, 620 F.3d at 220 (quoting De 
Canas, 424 U.S. at 355).
24
  In concluding that the housing 
provisions constituted impermissible regulation of 
immigration,  we recognized that “the fact that aliens are the 
subject of a state statute does not render it a regulation of 
                                                 
24
  See also Villas at Parkside Partners v. Farmers 
Branch, __ F.3d __, 2013 WL 3791664, at *15 (5th Cir. July 
22, 2013) (en banc) (Reavley, J., concurring) (“Because the 
sole purpose and effect of this [housing] ordinance is to target 
the presence of illegal aliens within the city . . . and to cause 
their removal, it contravenes the federal government‟s 
exclusive authority on the regulation of immigration and the 
conditions of residence in this country, and it constitutes an 
obstacle to federal authority over immigration and the 
conduct of foreign affairs.”); id. at *16 (Dennis, J., 
concurring) (“[T]he Ordinance is preempted in all of its core 
provisions by the comprehensive and interrelated federal 
legislative schemes governing the classification of 
noncitizens, the adjudication of immigration status, and the 
exclusion and deportation of noncitizens from the United 
States, enacted pursuant to the federal government‟s 
constitutional authority to administer a uniform national 
immigration policy.”).    
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immigration.”  De Canas, 424 U.S. at 355.  We did not hold 
that the housing provisions were a regulation of immigration 
simply because “aliens are the subject of” those provisions.  
Rather, we determined that “[t]hrough its housing provisions, 
Hazleton attempts to regulate residence based solely on 
immigration status.”  Lozano II, 620 F.3d at 220 (emphasis 
added).  Thus, we concluded that enforcement of the housing 
provisions must be enjoined because “[d]eciding which aliens 
may live in the United States has always been the prerogative 
of the federal government.”  Id.  The housing provisions of 
Hazleton‟s ordinances are nothing more than a thinly veiled 
attempt to regulate residency under the guise of a regulation 
of rental housing.  By barring aliens lacking lawful 
immigration status from rental housing in Hazleton, the 
housing provisions go to the core of an alien‟s residency.  
States and localities have no power to regulate residency 
based on immigration status. 
 
For these same reasons, we also concluded that the 
housing provisions are field pre-empted by the INA.  That 
statute is centrally concerned with “„the terms and conditions 
of admission to the country and the subsequent treatment of 
aliens lawfully admitted.‟”  Id. (quoting De Canas, 424 U.S. 
at 359).  The INA‟s comprehensive scheme “plainly 
precludes state efforts, whether harmonious or conflicting, to 
regulate residence in this country based on immigration 
status.”  Id.  We noted that although Hazleton‟s housing 
provisions do not control actual physical entry into, or 
expulsion from, Hazleton or the United States, “in essence, 
that is precisely what they attempt to do.”  Id. at 220 (internal 
quotations marks and citation omitted).  Again, we see 
nothing in the Supreme Court‟s decisions in Whiting or 
Arizona that undermines these conclusions.   
 
Since our decision in Lozano II, a number of courts 
have concluded that state or local laws proscribing the 
harboring of aliens lacking lawful status are also field pre-
empted because they intrude on the field of alien harboring.  
See, e.g., Ga. Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Governor 
of Ga., 691 F.3d 1250, 1263-65 (11th Cir. 2012) (“GLAHR”) 
(concluding that federal law occupies the field with respect to 
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“the entry, movement, and residence of aliens within the 
United States” and state law proscribing, inter alia, harboring 
is field pre-empted); United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 
1269, 1285-87 (11th Cir. 2012) (same), cert. denied, 569 U.S. 
__, 133 S. Ct. 2022 (2013); United States v. South Carolina, 
906 F. Supp. 2d 463, 468 (D.S.C. 2012) (concluding that 
provisions of state law proscribing transporting or sheltering 
aliens lacking lawful status “infringe upon a comprehensive 
federal statutory scheme”), aff’d, __ F.3d __, 2013 WL 
3803464 (4th Cir. July 23, 2013); Valle del Sol v. Whiting, 
No. 10-1061, 2012 WL 8021265, at *5 (D. Ariz. Sept. 5, 
2012) (concluding that state law proscribing, inter alia, 
harboring of aliens lacking lawful status is field pre-empted). 
 
As the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals explained:  
 
The INA provides a comprehensive 
framework to penalize the transportation, 
concealment, and inducement of 
unlawfully present aliens. Pursuant to 8 
U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii)-(iv), it is a 
federal crime for any person to transport 
or move an unlawfully present alien 
within the United States; to conceal, 
harbor, or shield an unlawfully present 
alien from detection; or to encourage or 
induce an alien to “come to, enter, or 
reside in the United States.” . . . Section 
1324(c) permits local law enforcement 
officers to arrest for these violations of 
federal law, but the federal courts 
maintain exclusive jurisdiction to 
prosecute for these crimes and interpret 
the boundaries of the federal statute. See 
id. § 1329. Subsection (d) of § 1324 
further dictates evidentiary rules 
governing prosecution of one of its 
enumerated offenses, and subsection (e) 
goes so far as to mandate a community 
outreach program to “educate the public 
in the United States and abroad about the 
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penalties for bringing in and harboring 
aliens in violation of this section.” 
 
GLAHR, 691 F.3d at 1263-64.  We agree with the Eleventh 
Circuit and other courts that have held that “the federal 
government has clearly expressed more than a „peripheral 
concern‟ with the entry, movement, and residence of aliens 
within the United States and the breadth of these laws 
illustrates an overwhelmingly dominant federal interest in the 
field.”  Id. at 1264 (citation omitted).   
 
The City argues that, by authorizing state and local 
officials to arrest individuals guilty of harboring, see 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1324(c), Congress specifically invited state and local 
governments into this field.  According to the City, this 
“invitation”—along with the requirement in 8 U.S.C. § 1373 
that federal agencies respond to inquiries from states and 
localities regarding any alien‟s immigration status—
forecloses any argument that the housing provisions are field 
pre-empted.  However, while § 1324(c) allows state officials 
to arrest for violations of crimes enumerated in that section, 
the federal statute does not authorize states to prosecute those 
crimes.  Instead, under federal law, the prosecution of such 
violations must take place in federal court and is at the sole 
discretion of federal officials.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1329.  “In the 
absence of a savings clause permitting state regulation in the 
field, the inference from these enactments is that the role of 
the state is limited to arrest for violations of federal [anti-
harboring] law.”  GLAHR, 691 F.3d at 1264.  
 
For the reasons explained above, we again hold that 
the housing provisions in the IIRAO and RO constitute an 
impermissible regulation of immigration and are field pre-
empted because they intrude on the regulation of residency 
and presence of aliens in the United States and the occupied 
field of  alien harboring. 
2. The Housing Provisions Are Conflict 
Pre-empted. 
In Lozano II, we concluded that the housing provisions 
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are also conflict pre-empted because they interfere with the 
federal government‟s discretion in, and control over, the 
removal process.  The exercise of that discretion implicates 
important foreign policy considerations.  Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 
at 2499.  We also concluded that the housing provisions are 
inconsistent with federal anti-harboring law.  Again, the 
subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court have not 
undermined our reasoning.  In fact, as suggested above and 
explained below, the Court‟s subsequent decisions reinforce 
our prior conflict pre-emption analysis with respect to the 
housing provisions.  
 
In Arizona, the Court emphasized that “[a] principle 
feature of the [INA‟s] removal system is the broad discretion 
exercised by immigration officials.”  Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 
2499.  “Federal officials . . . must decide whether it makes 
sense to pursue removal at all [and,] [i]f removal proceedings 
are commenced, [whether] aliens may seek . . . discretionary 
relief allowing them to remain in the country or at least to 
leave without formal removal.”  Id.25  Yet, by prohibiting the 
only realistic housing option many aliens have, Hazleton is 
clearly trying to prohibit unauthorized aliens from living 
within the City.  As we explained in Lozano II, the housing 
provisions, in effect, constitute an attempt to remove persons 
from the City based entirely on a snapshot of their current 
immigration status.  Accordingly, the housing provisions 
interfere with the federal government‟s discretion in deciding 
whether and when to initiate removal proceedings.  See 
Lozano II, 620 F.3d at 221-22.
26
   
                                                 
25
  See also Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 566 U.S. __, 
132 S. Ct. 2011, 2015 (2012) (“The immigration laws have 
long given the Attorney general discretion to permit certain 
otherwise-removable aliens to remain in the United States.”); 
Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 458 U.S. at 154 (“Where 
Congress has directed an administrator to exercise his 
discretion, his judgments are subject to judicial review only to 
determine whether he has exceeded his statutory authority or 
acted arbitrarily.”).   
26
  In Keller v. City of Fremont, __ F.3d __, 2013 WL 
3242111 (8th Cir. June 28, 2013), a divided panel of the 
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Indeed, interference with the federal removal process 
and the discretion entrusted to the Executive Branch are key 
reasons for the Supreme Court‟s conclusions that § 6 and § 3 
of Arizona‟s S.B. 1070 law are conflict pre-empted.  The 
Court reached that conclusion even though neither provision 
purports to physically remove any aliens from Arizona or the 
United States.  In affirming an injunction against § 6, which 
would have given Arizona police authority to arrest an 
individual based on probable cause to believe the individual 
has committed a removable offense, the Court determined 
that the provision “would allow the State to achieve its own 
immigration policy,” which could result in “unnecessary 
harassment of some aliens . . . whom federal officials 
determine should not be removed.”  Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 
2506.  The Court also found that “[b]y authorizing state 
officers to decide whether an alien should be detained for 
being removable, § 6 violates the principles that the removal 
process is entrusted to the discretion of the Federal 
Government.”  Id.   Similarly, in invalidating § 3, which 
                                                                                                             
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has recently 
concluded that a local ordinance, almost identical to the 
housing provisions in the RO and IIRAO, does not interfere 
with federal removal discretion.  The majority reasoned that 
the “rental provisions would only indirectly effect „removal‟ 
of any alien from the City,” in a manner comparable to how 
“denying aliens employment inevitably has the effect of 
„removing‟ some of them from the State.”  Id. at *8.  We 
disagree.  Restricting housing touches directly on residency 
and federal removal discretion.  As we explained in Lozano 
II, “[i]t is difficult to conceive of a more effective method of 
ensuring that persons do not enter or remain in a locality than 
by precluding their ability to live in it.”  Lozano II, 620 F.3d 
at 220-21 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
The Eighth Circuit also concluded that the rental restrictions  
do not determine who should or should not be admitted into 
the country and do not conflict with federal anti-harboring 
law.  See Keller, 2013 WL 3242111, at *5, *7.  For the 
reasons explained above, we disagree with these conclusions 
as well. 
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criminalized failure to carry an alien registration document in 
violation of federal law, the Court noted that, in addition to 
intruding on a field occupied by Congress, the provision also 
conflicts with federal law because it would give Arizona the 
power to act “even in circumstances where federal officials . . 
. determine that prosecution would frustrate federal policies.”  
Id. at 2503.   
 
The same infirmities are evident here.   Like the pre-
empted provisions in Arizona, the housing provisions 
constitute an attempt to unilaterally attach additional 
consequences to a person‟s immigration status with no regard 
for the federal scheme, federal enforcement priorities, or the 
discretion Congress vested in the Attorney General.  Congress 
has not banned persons who lack lawful status or proper 
documentation from obtaining rental or any other type of 
housing in the United States.  Hazleton‟s decision to impose 
this “distinct, unusual and extraordinary burden[] . . . upon 
aliens” impermissibly intrudes into the realm of federal 
authority.  Hines, 312 U.S. at 65-66.  Through the housing 
provisions, Hazleton is seeking to achieve “its own 
immigration policy,” one which will certainly result in 
“unnecessary harassment of some aliens . . . whom federal 
officials determine should not be removed.”  Arizona, 132 S. 
Ct. at 2506.   
 
Hazleton may not unilaterally prohibit those lacking 
lawful status from living within its boundaries, without regard 
for the Executive Branch‟s enforcement and policy priorities.  
“If every other state enacted similar legislation to overburden 
the lives of aliens, the immigration scheme would be turned 
on its head.”  United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d at 1295 
n.21.  Accordingly, the housing provisions conflict with 
federal law.  
 
In addition to undermining the comprehensive 
procedures under which federal officials determine whether 
an alien may remain in this country, Hazleton‟s housing 
provisions would create significant foreign policy and 
humanitarian concerns.  As the Court in Arizona emphasized, 
federal decisions in this arena “touch on foreign relations and 
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must be made with one voice.”  Id. at 2506-07.  “„One of the 
most important and delicate of all international relationships . 
. . has to do with the protection of the just rights of a 
country‟s own nationals when those nationals are in another 
country.‟”  Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2498-99 (quoting Hines, 
312 U.S. at 64).  “It is fundamental that foreign countries 
concerned about the status, safety, and security of their 
nationals in the United States must be able to confer and 
communicate on this subject with one national sovereign, not 
the 50 separate states.”  Id. at 2498.  In addition, “[p]erceived 
mistreatment of aliens in the United States may lead to 
harmful reciprocal treatment of American citizens abroad.”  
Id.  Accordingly, “[s]ome discretionary decisions [in the 
enforcement of immigration law] involve policy choices that 
bear on this Nation‟s international relations,” and the exercise 
of such discretion “embraces immediate human concerns.”  
Id. at 2499.  “Returning an alien to his own country may be 
deemed inappropriate even where he has committed a 
removable offense or fails to meet the criteria for admission.”  
Id.   
 
The Supreme Court‟s recognition of the primacy of the 
national interest in regulations directly affecting aliens in this 
country reinforces our holding in Lozano II that Hazleton‟s 
attempt to regulate where aliens can live implicates strong 
national interests and must be done with a single voice.
27
  
Other federal courts that have addressed this issue agree that 
attempts to proscribe harboring or restrict certain forms of 
housing for aliens lacking lawful immigration status are 
                                                 
27
  We realize, of course, that “[t]he pervasiveness of 
federal regulation does not diminish the importance of 
immigration policy to the States.”  Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 
2500.  Nonetheless, “„[t]he relative importance to the State of 
its own law is not material when there is a conflict with a 
valid federal law, for the Framers of our Constitution 
provided that the federal law must prevail.‟” Fid. Fed. Sav. & 
Loan Ass’n, 458 U.S. at 153 (quoting Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 
663, 666 (1962)); see also id. (Conflict pre-emption 
“principles are not inapplicable here simply because real 
property law is a matter of special concern to the States.”)  
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conflict pre-empted.  Similarly, when the issue has been 
presented in the context of a preliminary injunction, courts 
have found a substantial likelihood of conflict pre-emption 
for reasons similar to those we have described.  See, e.g., 
Villas at Parkside Partners v. Farmers Branch, __ F.3d __, 
2013 WL 3791664, at *8, *10 (5th Cir. July 22, 2013) (en 
banc) (concluding that local housing ordinance analogous to 
Hazleton‟s housing provisions conflicts with federal anti-
harboring law and federal removal procedures); GLAHR, 691 
F.3d at 1265-67 (concluding that state law proscribing, inter 
alia, harboring aliens lacking lawful status “presents an 
obstacle to the execution of the federal statutory scheme and 
challenges federal supremacy in the realm of immigration”); 
United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d at 1287-88 (same); 
United States v. South Carolina, 906 F. Supp. 2d at 468 
(concluding that provisions of state law proscribing 
transporting or sheltering aliens lacking lawful status would 
interfere with federal enforcement discretion), aff’d, __ F.3d 
__, 2013 WL 3803464 (4th Cir. July 23, 2013); Valle del Sol, 
2012 WL 8021265, at *6 (concluding that state law 
proscribing, inter alia, harboring of aliens lacking lawful 
status conflicts with federal law because it interferes with 
federal enforcement discretion); Keller v. City of Fremont, 
853 F. Supp. 2d 959, 972-73 (D. Neb. 2012), rev’d, 2013 WL 
3242111 (8th Cir. June 28, 2013) (concluding that city 
ordinance penalizing harboring or the lease or rental of 
dwelling units to aliens lacking lawful status would impair 
“the structure Congress has established for classification, 
adjudication, and potential removal of aliens”).   
 
Despite the obvious trespass into matters that must be 
left to the national sovereign, the City continues to insist there 
is no conflict pre-emption because it is merely engaging in 
“concurrent enforcement” of federal immigration laws.  
Under that theory, virtually any local jurisdiction could 
prohibit activity that is also prohibited by federal law as long 
as the local prohibition is not expressly pre-empted and the 
locality is not acting in a field that is occupied by federal law.  
The City cites to a decision from the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in support of its contention:  “Where state 
enforcement activities do not impair federal regulatory 
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interests concurrent enforcement activity is authorized.”  
Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 474 (9th Cir. 1983), 
overruled by Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 
(9th Cir. 1999).  However, that argument collapses under its 
own weight.  It requires that local enforcement activity not 
impair federal regulatory interests.  It says nothing about the 
propriety of concurrent enforcement when the local 
enforcement does impair federal regulatory interests; yet, that 
is the situation here.  
 
Moreover, the City‟s argument simply cannot be 
reconciled with the Supreme Court‟s holding in Arizona.  
There, the Court reasoned that “[a]lthough § 5(C) attempts to 
achieve one of the same goals as federal law—the deterrence 
of unlawful employment—it involves a conflict in the method 
of enforcement.”  Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2505.  The Court 
went on to explain that it had previously “recognized that a 
„[c]onflict in technique can be fully as disruptive to the 
system Congress enacted as conflict in overt policy.‟”  Id. 
(quoting Motor Coach Employees, 403 U.S. at 287).  Thus, 
the Court found § 5(C) pre-empted even though the provision 
imposed sanctions only on conduct already prohibited under 
federal law.
28
     
 
Furthermore, it must be remembered that the housing 
provisions are not “concurrent” with federal law, despite 
Hazleton‟s argument to the contrary.  In addition to 
interfering with federal removal discretion, the housing 
provisions conflict with federal law because they define 
                                                 
28
  While we acknowledge that § 5(C) attempted to 
enact “a state criminal prohibition where no federal 
counterpart exists,” Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2503 (emphasis 
added), federal law does nonetheless prohibit unauthorized 
employment and imposes civil penalties on aliens who seek 
or engage in unauthorized work.  See id. at 2504 (listing civil 
penalties imposed on aliens who seek or engage in work 
without authorization).  Thus, § 5(C) is an example of a 
state‟s “concurrent enforcement” effort, as that term is 
defined by the City, which was nonetheless found to be 
conflict pre-empted by the Supreme Court.   
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“harboring” to include simple landlord-tenant relationships.  
Although the Supreme Court has yet to define “harboring” as 
that term is used in 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii), we have 
found that culpability requires some act of concealment from 
authorities.  See Lozano II, 620 F.3d at 223.  “We . . . define 
„harboring‟ as conduct „tending to substantially facilitate an 
alien‟s remaining in the United States illegally and to prevent 
government authorities from detecting the alien’s unlawful 
presence.”  Id. (quoting United States v. Ozcelik, 527 F.3d 88, 
100 (3d Cir. 2008) (emphasis added)); see also United States 
v. Kim, 193 F.3d 567, 574 (2d Cir. 1999) (Harboring 
“encompasses conduct tending substantially to facilitate an 
alien‟s remaining in the United States illegally and to prevent 
government authorities from detecting his unlawful 
presence.”).  Renting an apartment in the normal course of 
business is not, without more, conduct that prevents the 
government from detecting an alien‟s unlawful presence.  
Thus, it is highly unlikely that renting an apartment to an 
unauthorized alien would be sufficient to constitute harboring 
in violation of the INA.
29
  
 
The City also argues that Whiting held that a 
verification under 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) is an accurate 
assessment of an alien‟s immigration status and a sufficient 
basis for state or local action with respect to that alien.  The 
City overlooks, however, that the state or locality must first 
have authority to take the underlying action with respect to an 
alien.  Only then is verification under 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) 
relevant to support permissible state or local action.  Because 
the Whiting plurality held that Arizona‟s employer sanctions 
law was a valid licensing law not pre-empted by IRCA, it 
followed that a federal verification of immigration status is a 
proper basis upon which Arizona may impose its licensing 
                                                 
29
  See also Villas at Parkside Partners, 2013 WL 
3791664, at *5 (concluding that, “by criminalizing conduct 
that does not have the effect of evading federal detection, and 
by giving state officials authority to act as immigration 
officers outside the „limited circumstances‟ specified by 
federal law,” local housing ordinance conflicts with federal 
anti-harboring law).  
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sanctions.  That is not the case with respect to the housing 
provisions in Hazleton‟s ordinances.   
 
As we have explained, the housing provisions are 
themselves pre-empted.  It is therefore irrelevant that they 
would be imposed pursuant to a valid status verification under 
§ 1373(c).  Hazleton simply does not have the legal authority 
to take that action even if done pursuant to a valid 
determination of status under federal law.  See Arizona, 132 
S. Ct. at 2505 (explaining why § 5(C) of Arizona‟s S.B. 1070 
law, which attempted to impose sanctions on unauthorized 
workers, was conflict pre-empted); A.R.S. § 13-2928(E) 
(providing that “[i]n the enforcement of [§ 5(C)], an alien‟s 
immigration status may be determined . . . pursuant to 8 
[U.S.C.] § 1373(c)”). 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we again hold that the 
housing provisions conflict with federal law and are thus pre-
empted.
 
 
3. The Rental Registration Provisions in the 
RO Are Field Pre-empted Even When 
Divorced from the Harboring Provisions 
in the IIRAO.  
The approach throughout this litigation has been to 
consider the relevant housing provisions in the RO in 
conjunction with those in the IIRAO.  Nonetheless, it is 
theoretically possible that the rental registration scheme in the 
RO may not conflict with federal immigration law if divorced 
from the harboring provisions and sanctions in the IIRAO.
30
  
                                                 
30
  See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2508-09 (vacating 
injunction against § 2(B) of Arizona‟s S.B. 1070 law because 
Congress “has encouraged the sharing of information 
[between federal and state officials] about possible 
immigration violations” and § 2(B) could be read to avoid 
constitutional concerns); 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10)(A)-(B) 
(requiring no formal agreement for state and local authorities 
to “communicate with the Attorney General regarding the 
immigration status of any individual” or  “otherwise to 
  
 
45 
However, we conclude that the housing provisions in the RO, 
even if considered separately from the anti-harboring 
provisions in the IIRAO, are pre-empted because they intrude 
upon the field occupied by federal alien registration law.
 31
   
 
As we have explained, the RO requires those seeking 
to occupy rental housing to register with the City and obtain 
an occupancy permit.  To obtain an occupancy permit, the 
applicant need only pay the requisite registration fee and 
submit the name and address of the prospective occupant, the 
name of the landlord, the address of the rental unit, and 
“proof of legal citizenship and/or residency.”  RO § 7b.  As 
the City itself points out, under the terms of the RO alone, all 
applicants are issued an occupancy permit upon providing the 
required information and the requisite fee—even if the 
applicant indicates that she lacks legal status.  Those who 
occupy rental housing without complying with this 
registration scheme are subject to fines of $100 to $300, or 
imprisonment for up to 90 days in default of payment.  RO § 
10a.  Thus, the rental registration scheme of the RO standing 
alone operates as a requirement that a subset of Hazleton‟s 
population—those residing in rental housing—register their 
immigration status with the City. 
 
                                                                                                             
cooperate with the Attorney General in the identification, 
apprehension, detention, or removal of aliens not lawfully 
present in the United States”). 
31
  We previously concluded that “[t]he sole 
severability issue Hazleton has not waived concerns the 
IIRAO‟s private cause of action.”  Lozano II, 620 F.3d at 182.  
As we explained in supra note 5, that holding is not at issue 
here.  However, we acknowledge that our prior severability 
holding may not necessarily foreclose a decision to uphold 
the RO, and the rental registration scheme, if considered 
separately from the related anti-harboring provisions in the 
IIRAO.  Indeed, those provisions appear in separate statutes.  
This does not impact the outcome here, however, because, as 
we explain below, the rental registration scheme in the RO is 
itself field pre-empted.  
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It is beyond dispute that states and localities may not 
intrude in the field of alien registration.  Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 
2502 (reiterating holding in Hines, 312 U.S. at 70, that “the 
Federal Government has occupied the field of alien 
registration”).  Thus, in Arizona, the Supreme Court found 
pre-empted § 3 of Arizona‟s S.B. 1070 law, which forbade 
“willful failure to complete or carry an alien registration 
document” in violation of federal law.  Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 
2501.  Hazleton‟s rental registration scheme similarly 
intrudes into the field of alien registration.  One of the rental 
registration scheme‟s primary functions is to require rental 
housing occupants to report their immigration status to the 
City of Hazleton and penalize the failure to register and 
obtain an occupancy permit pursuant to that requirement.  
This attempt to create a local alien registration requirement is 
field pre-empted.   
 
In arguing that the RO is nothing like an alien 
registration system, the City claims “the most notable 
difference” is that the RO applies equally to citizens and 
aliens alike while the federal Alien Registration Act applies 
only to noncitizens.
32
  We are not persuaded.  It is highly 
unlikely that the local registration laws invalidated on field 
pre-emption grounds in Hines or Arizona would have been 
upheld if they applied to citizens and aliens alike.  The RO‟s 
registration scheme cannot avoid pre-emption merely because 
it requires both citizens and noncitizens to declare their 
immigration status.
33
  The City also argues that a finding that 
                                                 
32
  The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit adopted 
this argument and concluded that a similar rental registration 
scheme is not field pre-empted.  See Keller, 2013 WL 
3242111, at *6 (“The occupancy license scheme at issue is 
nothing like the state registration laws invalidated in Hines 
and in Arizona [because it] requires all renters, including U.S. 
citizens and nationals, to obtain an occupancy license. . . . ). 
33
  Indeed, Hazleton‟s requirement that citizens, in 
addition to non-citizens, register their immigration status is an 
even worse transgression into the field of alien registration 
law as it imposes burdens on U.S. citizens that are absent 
from federal law.  Since Congress has not seen fit to require 
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the RO constitutes an alien registration system is implausible 
because it would require the invalidation of laws limiting 
drivers‟ licenses to lawfully present aliens.  This argument is 
also unpersuasive.  Basing eligibility for certain state 
privileges on immigration status is distinct from requiring 
aliens to register.  The RO‟s rental registration scheme serves 
no discernible purpose other than to register the immigration 
status of a subset of the City‟s population.  It can only be 
viewed as an impermissible alien registration requirement.
34
  
 
IV.  Conclusion 
 
For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the 
employment provisions in the IIRAO are distinguishable from 
the Arizona law upheld in Whiting, and the Supreme Court‟s 
reasoning in Whiting and Arizona does not otherwise 
undermine our conclusion that both the employment and 
housing provisions in the IIRAO and RO are pre-empted by 
federal law.  Accordingly, we will again affirm in part and 
reverse in part the District Court‟s order permanently 
enjoining Hazleton‟s enforcement of the IIRAO and RO.    
 
V.  Appendix 
 
A.  The Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance 
(Ordinance 2006-18, as amended by Ordinances 2006-40 
and 2007-7) 
 
                                                                                                             
U.S. citizens to prove their citizenship status before obtaining 
rental housing, we are at a loss to understand Hazleton‟s 
argument that imposing this burden on citizens saves the 
RO‟s registration scheme from pre-emption.  
34
  The RO is also distinguishable from § 2(B) of 
Arizona‟s S.B. 1070, which the Supreme Court did not enjoin 
in Arizona.  Section 2(B), unlike the rental registration 
scheme in the RO, did not impose any registration obligation 
on aliens.  Rather, § 2(B) imposed only an obligation on local 
police to verify the immigration status of persons stopped, 
detained or arrested.  Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2507-10. 
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ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION RELIEF ACT ORDINANCE 
BE IT ORDAINED BY THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF 
HAZLETON AS FOLLOWS: 
SECTION 1. TITLE 
This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the “City of 
Hazleton Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance.”  
SECTION 2. FINDINGS AND DECLARATION OF 
PURPOSE 
 
The People of the City of Hazleton find and declare: 
 
A. That state and federal law require that certain conditions 
be met before a person may be authorized to work or reside in 
this country. 
 
B. That unlawful workers and illegal aliens, as defined by this 
ordinance and state and federal law, do not normally meet 
such conditions as a matter of law when present in the City of 
Hazleton. 
 
C. That unlawful employment, the harboring of illegal aliens 
in dwelling units in the City of Hazleton, and crime 
committed by illegal aliens harm the health, safety and 
welfare of authorized U.S. workers and legal residents in the 
City of Hazleton. Illegal immigration leads to higher crime 
rates, subjects our hospitals to fiscal hardship and legal 
residents to substandard quality of care, contributes to other 
burdens on public services, increasing their cost and 
diminishing their availability to legal residents, and 
diminishes our overall quality of life. 
 
D. That the City of Hazleton is authorized to abate public 
nuisances and empowered and mandated by the people of 
Hazleton to abate the nuisance of illegal immigration by 
diligently prohibiting the acts and policies that facilitate 
illegal immigration in a manner consistent with federal law 
and the objectives of Congress. 
 
E. That United States Code Title 8, subsection 1324(a)(1)(A) 
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prohibits the harboring of illegal aliens. The provision of 
housing to illegal aliens is a fundamental component of 
harboring. 
 
F. This ordinance seeks to secure to those lawfully present in 
the United States and this City, whether or not they are 
citizens of the United States, the right to live in peace free of 
the threat crime, to enjoy the public services provided by this 
city without being burdened by the cost of providing goods, 
support and services to aliens unlawfully present in the 
United States, and to be free of the debilitating effects on 
their economic and social well being imposed by the influx of 
illegal aliens to the fullest extent that these goals can be 
achieved consistent with the Constitution and Laws of the 
United States and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 
 
G. The City shall not construe this ordinance to prohibit the 
rendering of emergency medical care, emergency assistance, 
or legal assistance to any person. 
SECTION 3. DEFINITIONS 
 
When used in this chapter, the following words, terms and 
phrases shall have the meanings ascribed to them herein, and 
shall be construed so as to be consistent 
with state and federal law, including federal immigration law: 
 
A. “Business entity” means any person or group of persons 
performing or engaging in any activity, enterprise, profession, 
or occupation for gain, benefit, advantage, or livelihood, 
whether for profit or not for profit. 
 
(1) The term business entity shall include but not be 
limited to selfemployed individuals, partnerships, 
corporations, contractors, and subcontractors. 
(2) The term business entity shall include any business 
entity that possesses a business permit, any business entity 
that is exempt by law from obtaining such a business 
permit, and any business entity that is operating 
unlawfully without such a business permit. 
 
  
 
50 
B. “City” means the City of Hazleton. 
 
C. “Contractor” means a person, employer, subcontractor or 
business entity that enters into an agreement to perform any 
service or work or to provide a certain product in exchange 
for valuable consideration. This definition shall include but 
not be limited to a subcontractor, contract employee, or a 
recruiting or staffing entity. 
 
D. “Illegal Alien” means an alien who is not lawfully present 
in the United States, according to the terms of United States 
Code Title 8, section 1101 et seq. The City shall not conclude 
that a person is an illegal alien unless and until an authorized 
representative of the City has verified with the federal 
government, pursuant to United States Code Title 8, 
subsection 1373(c), that the person is an alien who is not 
lawfully present in the United States. 
 
E. “Unlawful worker” means a person who does not have the 
legal right or authorization to work due to an impediment in 
any provision of federal, state or local law, including but not 
limited to a minor disqualified by nonage, or an unauthorized 
alien as defined by United States Code Title 8, subsection 
1324a(h)(3). 
 
F. “Work” means any job, task, employment, labor, personal 
services, or any other activity for which compensation is 
provided, expected, or due, including but not limited to all 
activities conducted by business entities. 
  
G. “Basic Pilot Program” means the electronic verification of 
work authorization program of the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996, P.L. 
104-208, Division C, Section 403(a); United States Code 
Title 8, subsection 1324a, and operated by the United States 
Department of Homeland Security (or a successor program 
established by the federal government.) 
SECTION 4. BUSINESS PERMITS, CONTRACTS, OR 
GRANTS   
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A. It is unlawful for any business entity to knowingly recruit, 
hire for employment, or continue to employ, or to permit, 
dispatch, or instruct any person who is an unlawful worker to 
perform work in whole or part within the City. Every business 
entity that applies for a business permit to engage in any type 
of work in the City shall sign an affidavit, prepared by the 
City Solicitor, affirming that they do not knowingly utilize 
the services or hire any person who is an unlawful worker. 
 
B. Enforcement: The Hazleton Code Enforcement Office 
shall enforce the requirements of this section. 
 
(1) An enforcement action shall be initiated by means of a 
written signed complaint to the Hazleton Code 
Enforcement Office submitted by any City official, 
business entity, or City resident. A valid complaint shall 
include an allegation which describes the alleged 
violator(s) as well as the actions constituting the violation, 
and the date and location where such actions occurred. 
(2) A complaint which alleges a violation on the basis of 
national origin, ethnicity, or race shall be deemed invalid 
and shall not be enforced. 
(3) Upon receipt of a valid complaint, the Hazleton Code 
Enforcement Office shall, within three business days, 
request identity information from the business entity 
regarding any persons alleged to be unlawful workers. The 
Hazleton Code Enforcement Office shall suspend the 
business permit of any business entity which fails, within 
three business days after receipt of the request, to provide 
such information. In instances where an unlawful worker 
is alleged to be an unauthorized alien, as defined in United 
States Code Title 8, subsection 1324a(h)(3), the Hazleton 
Code Enforcement Office shall submit identity data 
required by the federal government to verify, pursuant to 
United States Code Title 8, section 1373, the immigration 
status of such person(s), and shall provide the business 
entity with written confirmation of that verification. 
(4) The Hazleton Code Enforcement Office shall suspend 
the business permit of any business entity which fails 
correct a violation of this section within three business 
days after notification of the violation by the Hazleton 
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Code Enforcement Office. 
(5) The Hazleton Code Enforcement Office shall not 
suspend the business permit of a business entity if, prior to 
the date of the violation, the business entity had verified 
the work authorization of the alleged unlawful worker(s) 
using the Basic Pilot Program. 
(6) The suspension shall terminate one business day after 
a legal representative of the business entity submits, at a 
City office designated by the City Solicitor, a sworn 
affidavit stating that the violation has ended. 
(a) The affidavit shall include a description of the 
specific measures and actions taken by the business 
entity to end the violation, and shall include the name, 
address and other adequate identifying information of 
the unlawful workers related to the complaint. 
(b) Where two or more of the unlawful workers were 
verified by the federal government to be unauthorized 
aliens, the legal representative of the business entity 
shall submit to the Hazleton Code Enforcement Office, 
in addition to the prescribed affidavit, documentation 
acceptable to the City Solicitor which confirms that the 
business entity has enrolled in and will participate in 
the Basic Pilot Program for the duration of the validity 
of the business permit granted to the business entity. 
(7) For a second or subsequent violation, the Hazleton 
Code Enforcement Office shall suspend the business 
permit of a business entity for a period of twenty days. 
After the end of the suspension period, and upon receipt of 
the prescribed affidavit, the Hazleton Code Enforcement 
Office shall reinstate the business permit. The Hazleton 
Code Enforcement Office shall forward the affidavit, 
complaint, and associated documents to the appropriate 
federal enforcement agency, pursuant to United States 
Code Title 8, section 1373. In the case of an unlawful 
worker disqualified by state law not related to 
immigration, the Hazleton Code Enforcement Office shall 
forward the affidavit, complaint, and associated 
documents to the appropriate state enforcement agency. 
 
C. All agencies of the City shall enroll and participate in the 
Basic Pilot Program. 
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D. As a condition for the award of any City contract or grant 
to a business entity for which the value of employment, labor 
or, personal services shall exceed $10,000, the business entity 
shall provide documentation confirming its enrollment and 
participation in the Basic Pilot Program. 
 
E. Private Cause of Action for Unfairly Discharged 
Employees 
 
(1) The discharge of any employee who is not an unlawful 
worker by a business entity in the City is an unfair 
business practice if, on the date of the discharge, the 
business entity was not participating in the Basic Pilot 
program and the business entity was employing an 
unlawful worker. 
(2) The discharged worker shall have a private cause of 
action in the Municipal Court of Hazleton against the 
business entity for the unfair business practice. The 
business entity found to have violated this subsection shall 
be liable to the aggrieved employee for:  
(a) three times the actual damages sustained by the 
employee, including but not limited to lost wages or 
compensation from the date of the discharge until the 
date the employee has procured new employment at an 
equivalent rate of compensation, up to a period of one 
hundred and twenty days; and 
(b) reasonable attorney‟s fees and costs. 
SECTION 5. HARBORING ILLEGAL ALIENS 
 
A. It is unlawful for any person or business entity that owns a 
dwelling unit in the City to harbor an illegal alien in the 
dwelling unit, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that 
an alien has come to, entered, or remains in the United States 
in violation of law, unless such harboring is otherwise 
expressly permitted by federal law. 
 
(1) For the purposes of this section, to let, lease, or rent a 
dwelling unit to an illegal alien, knowing or in reckless 
disregard of the fact that an alien has come to, entered, or 
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remains in the United States in violation of law, shall be 
deemed to constitute harboring. To suffer or permit the 
occupancy of the dwelling unit by an illegal alien, 
knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien 
has come to, entered, or remains in the United States in 
violation of law, shall also be deemed to constitute 
harboring. 
(2) A separate violation shall be deemed to have been 
committed on each day that such harboring occurs, and for 
each adult illegal alien harbored in the dwelling unit, 
beginning one business day after receipt of a notice of 
violation from the Hazleton Code Enforcement Office. 
(3) A separate violation of this section shall be deemed to 
have been committed for each business day on which the 
owner fails to provide the Hazleton Code Enforcement 
Office with identity data needed to obtain a federal 
verification of immigration status, beginning three days 
after the owner receives written notice from the Hazleton 
Code Enforcement Office. 
 
B. Enforcement: The Hazleton Code Enforcement Office 
shall enforce the requirements of this section. 
 
(1) An enforcement action shall be initiated by means of a 
written signed complaint to the Hazleton Code 
Enforcement Office submitted by any official, business 
entity, or resident of the City. A valid complaint shall 
include an allegation which describes the alleged 
violator(s) as well as the actions constituting the violation, 
and the date and location where such actions occurred. 
(2) A complaint which alleges a violation on the basis of 
national origin, ethnicity, or race shall be deemed invalid 
and shall not be enforced. 
(3) Upon receipt of a valid written complaint, the 
Hazleton Code Enforcement Office shall, pursuant to 
United States Code Title 8, section 1373(c), verify with 
the federal government the immigration status of a person 
seeking to use, occupy, lease, or rent a dwelling unit in the 
City. The Hazleton Code Enforcement Office shall submit 
identity data required by the federal government to verify 
immigration status. The City shall forward identity data 
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provided by the owner to the federal government, and 
shall provide the property owner with written 
confirmation of that verification. 
(4) If after five business days following receipt of written 
notice from the City that a violation has occurred and that 
the immigration status of any alleged illegal alien has been 
verified, pursuant to United States Code Title 8, section 
1373(c), the owner of the dwelling unit fails to correct a 
violation of this section, the Hazleton Code Enforcement 
Office shall deny or suspend the rental license of the 
dwelling unit. 
(5) For the period of suspension, the owner of the 
dwelling unit shall not be permitted to collect any rent, 
payment, fee, or any other form of compensation from, or 
on behalf of, any tenant or occupant in the dwelling unit.  
(6) The denial or suspension shall terminate one business 
day after a legal representative of the dwelling unit owner 
submits to the Hazleton Code Enforcement Office a sworn 
affidavit stating that each and every violation has ended. 
The affidavit shall include a description of the specific 
measures and actions taken by the business entity to end 
the violation, and shall include the name, address and 
other adequate identifying information for the illegal 
aliens who were the subject of the complaint. 
(7) The Hazleton Code Enforcement Office shall forward 
the affidavit, complaint, and associated documents to the 
appropriate federal enforcement agency, pursuant to 
United States Code Title 8, section 1373. 
(8) Any dwelling unit owner who commits a second or 
subsequent violation of this section shall be subject to a 
fine of two hundred and fifty dollars ($250) for each 
separate violation. The suspension provisions of this 
section applicable to a first violation shall also apply. 
(9) Upon the request of a dwelling unit owner, the 
Hazleton Code Enforcement Office shall, pursuant to 
United States Code Title 8, section 1373(c), verify with 
the federal government the lawful immigration status of a 
person seeking to use, occupy, lease, or rent a dwelling 
unit in the City. The penalties in this section shall not 
apply in the case of dwelling unit occupants whose status 
as an alien lawfully present in the United States has been 
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verified. 
SECTION 6. CONSTRUCTION AND SEVERABILITY 
 
A. The requirements and obligations of this section shall be 
implemented in a manner fully consistent with federal law 
regulating immigration and protecting the civil rights of all 
citizens and aliens. 
 
B. If any part of provision of this Chapter is in conflict or 
inconsistent with applicable provisions of federal or state 
statutes, or is otherwise held to be invalid or unenforceable by 
any court of competent jurisdiction, such part of provision 
shall be suspended and superseded by such applicable laws or 
regulations, and the remainder of this Chapter shall not be 
affected thereby. 
SECTION 7. IMPLEMENTATION AND PROCESS 
 
A. Prospective Application Only. The default presumption 
with respect to Ordinances of the City of Hazleton—that such 
Ordinances shall apply only prospectively—shall pertain to 
the Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance. The Illegal 
Immigration Relief Act Ordinance shall be applied only to 
employment contracts, agreements to perform service or 
work, and agreements to provide a certain product in 
exchange for valuable consideration that are entered into or 
are renewed after the date that the Illegal Immigration Relief 
Act Ordinance becomes effective and any judicial injunction 
prohibiting its implementation is removed. The Illegal 
Immigration Relief Act Ordinance shall be applied only to 
contracts to let, lease, or rent dwelling units that are entered 
into or are renewed after the date that the Illegal Immigration 
Relief Act Ordinance becomes effective and any judicial 
injunction prohibiting its implementation is removed. The 
renewal of a month-to-month lease or other type of tenancy 
which automatically renews absent notice by either party will 
not be considered as entering into a new contract to let, lease 
or rent a dwelling unit. 
 
B. Condition of Lease. Consistent with the obligations of a 
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rental unit owner described in Section 5.A., a tenant may not 
enter into a contract for the rental or leasing of a dwelling unit 
unless the tenant is either a U.S. citizen or an alien lawfully 
present in the United States according to the terms of United 
States Code Title 8, Section 1101 et seq. A tenant who is 
neither a U.S. citizen nor an alien lawfully present in the 
United States who enters into such a contract shall be deemed 
to have breached a condition of the lease under 68 P.S. 
Section 250.501. A tenant who is not a U.S. citizen who 
subsequent to the beginning of his tenancy becomes 
unlawfully present in the United States shall be deemed to 
have breached a condition of the lease under 68 P.S. Section 
250.501. 
 
C. Corrections of Violations—Employment of Unlawful 
Workers. The correction of a violation with respect to the 
employment of an unlawful worker shall include any of the 
following actions: 
 
(1) The business entity terminates the unlawful worker‟s 
employment. 
(2) The business entity, after acquiring additional 
information from the worker, requests a secondary or 
additional verification by the federal government of the 
worker‟s authorization, pursuant to the procedures of the 
Basic Pilot Program. While this verification is pending, 
the three business day period described in Section 4.B.(4) 
shall be tolled. 
(3) The business entity attempts to terminate the unlawful 
worker‟s employment and such termination is challenged 
in a court of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. While 
the business entity pursues the termination of the unlawful 
worker‟s employment in such forum, the three business 
day period described in Section 4.B.(4) shall be tolled. 
 
D. Corrections of Violations—Harboring Illegal Aliens. The 
correction of a violation with respect to the harboring of an 
illegal alien in a dwelling unit shall include any of the 
following actions: 
 
(1) A notice to quit, in writing, issued and served by the 
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dwelling unit owner, as landlord, to the tenant declaring a 
forfeiture of the lease for breach of the lease condition 
describe in Section 7.B. 
(2) The dwelling unit owner, after acquiring additional 
information from the alien, requests the City of Hazleton 
to obtain a secondary or additional verification by the 
federal government that the alien is lawfully present in the 
United States, under the procedures designated by the 
federal government, pursuant to United States Code Title 
8, Subsection 1373(c). While this second verification is 
pending, the five business day period described in Section 
5.B.(4) shall be tolled. 
(3) The commencement of an action for the recovery of 
possession of real property in accordance with 
Pennsylvania law by the landlord against the illegal alien. 
If such action is contested by the tenant in court, the 
dwelling unit owner shall be deemed to have complied 
with this Ordinance while the dwelling unit owner is 
pursuing the action in court. While this process is pending, 
the five business day period described in Section 5.B.(4) 
shall be tolled. 
 
E. Procedure if Verification is Delayed. If the federal 
government notifies the City of Hazleton that it is unable to 
verify whether a tenant is lawfully present in the United 
States or whether an employee is authorized to work in the 
United States, the City of Hazleton shall take no further 
action on the complaint until a verification from the federal 
government concerning the status of the individual is 
received. At no point shall any City official attempt to make 
an independent determination of any alien‟s legal status, 
without verification from the federal government, pursuant to 
United States Code Title 8, Subsection 1373(c). 
 
F. Venue for Judicial Process. Any business entity or rental 
unit owner subject to a complaint and subsequent 
enforcement under this ordinance, or any employee of such a 
business entity or tenant of such a rental unit owner, may 
challenge the enforcement of this Ordinance with respect to 
such entity or individual in the Magisterial District Court for 
the City of Hazleton, subject to the right of appeal to the 
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Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas. Such an entity or 
individual may alternatively challenge the enforcement of this 
Ordinance with respect to such entity or individual in any 
other court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with 
applicable law, subject to all rights of appeal. 
 
G. Deference to Federal Determinations of Status. The 
determination of  whether a tenant of a dwelling is lawfully 
present in the United States, and the determination of whether 
a worker is an unauthorized alien shall be made by the federal 
government, pursuant to United States Code Title 8, 
Subsection 1373(c). A determination of such status of an 
individual by the federal government shall create a rebuttable 
presumption as to that individual‟s status in any judicial 
proceedings brought pursuant to this ordinance. The Court 
may take judicial notice of any verification of the individual 
previously provided by the federal government and may 
request the federal government to provide automated or 
testimonial verification pursuant to United States Code Title 
8, Subsection 1373(c). 
 
 
B.  Rental Registration Ordinance (Ordinance 2006-13) 
 
ESTABLISHING A REGISTRATION PROGRAM FOR 
RESIDENTIAL RENTAL PROPERTIES; REQUIRING 
ALL OWNERS OF RESIDENTIAL RENTAL 
PROPERTIES TO DESIGNATE AN AGENT FOR 
SERVICE OF PROCESS; AND PRESCRIBING DUTIES 
OF OWNERS, AGENTS AND OCCUPANTS; DIRECTING 
THE DESIGNATION OF AGENTS; ESTABLISHING 
FEES FOR THE COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE 
REGISTRATION OF RENTAL PROPERTY; AND 
PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS BE IT 
ORDAINED BY THE GOVERNING BODY OF THE CITY 
OF HAZLETON AND IT IS HEREBY ORDAINED AND 
WITH THE AUTHORITY OF THE SAME AS FOLLOWS:  
SECTION 1. DEFINITIONS AND INTERPRETATION. 
 
The following words, when used in this ordinance, shall have 
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the meanings ascribed to them in this section, except in those 
instances where the context clearly indicates otherwise. When 
not inconsistent with the context, words used in the present 
tense include the future; words in the plural number include 
the singular number; words in the singular shall include the 
plural, and words in the masculine shall include the feminine 
and the neuter. 
 
a. AGENT—Individual of legal majority who has been 
designated by the Owner as the agent of the Owner or 
manager of the Property under the provisions of this 
ordinance. 
 
b. CITY—City of Hazleton 
 
c. CITY CODE—the building code (property Maintenance 
Code 1996 as amended or superceded) officially adopted by 
the governing body of the City, or other such codes officially 
designated by the governing body of the City for the 
regulation of construction, alteration, addition, repair, 
removal, demolition, location, occupancy and maintenance of 
buildings and structures. 
 
d. ZONING ORDINANCE—Zoning ordinance as officially 
adopted by the City of Hazleton, File of Council # 95-26 (as 
amended). 
 
e. OFFICE—The Office of Code Enforcement for the City of 
Hazleton. 
 
f. DWELLING UNIT—a single habitable unit, providing 
living facilities for one or more persons, including permanent 
space for living, sleeping, eating, cooking and bathing and 
sanitation, whether furnished or unfurnished. There may be 
more than one Dwelling Unit on a Premises. 
 
g. DORMITORY—a residence hall offered as student or 
faculty housing to accommodate a college or university, 
providing living or sleeping rooms for individuals or groups 
of individuals, with or without cooking facilities and with or 
without private baths. 
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h. INSPECTOR—any person authorized by Law or 
Ordinance to inspect buildings or systems, e.g. zoning, 
housing, plumbing, electrical systems, heat systems, 
mechanical systems and health necessary to operate or use 
buildings within the City of Hazleton. An Inspector would 
include those identified in Section 8—Enforcement. 
 
i. FIRE DEPARTMENT—the Fire Department of the City of 
Hazleton or any member thereof, and includes the Chief of 
Fire or his designee. 
 
j. HOTEL—a building or part of a building in which living 
and sleeping accommodations are used primarily for transient 
occupancy, may be rented on a daily basis, and desk service is 
provided, in addition to one or more of the following services: 
maid, telephone, bellhop service, or the furnishing or 
laundering of linens. 
 
k. LET FOR OCCUPANCY—to permit, provide or offer, for 
consideration, possession or occupancy of a building, 
dwelling unit, rooming unit, premise or structure by a person 
who is not the legal owner of record thereof, pursuant to a 
written or unwritten lease, agreement or license, or pursuant 
to a recorded or unrecorded agreement or contract for the sale 
of land. 
 
l. MOTEL—a building or group of buildings which contain 
living and sleeping accommodations used primarily for 
transient occupancy, may be rented on a daily basis, and desk 
service is provided, and has individual entrances from outside 
the building to serve each such living or sleeping unit. 
 
m. OCCUPANT—a person age 18 or older who resides at a 
Premises. 
 
n. OPERATOR—any person who has charge, care or control 
of a Premises which is offered or let for occupancy. 
 
o. OWNER—any Person, Agent, or Operator having a legal 
or equitable interest in the property; or recorded in the official 
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records of the state, county, or municipality as holding title to 
the property; or otherwise having control of the property, 
including the guardian of the estate of any such person, and 
the executor or administrator of the estate of such person if 
ordered to take possession of real property by a Court of 
competent jurisdiction. 
 
p. OWNER-OCCUPANT—an owner who resides in a 
Dwelling Unit on a regular permanent basis, or who 
otherwise occupies a nonresidential portion of the Premises 
on a regular permanent basis. 
 
q. PERSON—any person, partnership, firm, association, 
corporation, or municipal authority or any other group acting 
as a single unit. 
 
r. POLICE DEPARTMENT—the Police Department of the 
City of Hazleton or any member thereof sworn to enforce 
laws and ordinances in the City, and includes the Chief of 
Police or his designee. 
 
s. PREMISES—any parcel of real property in the City, 
including the land and all buildings and structures in which 
one or more Rental Units are located. 
 
t. RENTAL UNIT—means a Dwelling Unit or Rooming Unit 
which is Let for Occupancy and is occupied by one or more 
Tenants. 
 
u. ROOMING UNIT—any room or groups of rooms forming 
a single habitable unit occupied or intended to be occupied 
for sleeping or living, but not for cooking purposes. 
 
v. TENANT—any Person authorized by the Owner or Agent 
who occupies a Rental Unit within a Premises regardless of 
whether such Person has executed a lease for said Premises. 
SECTION 2. APPOINTMENT OF AN AGENT AND/OR 
MANAGER 
 
Each Owner who is not an Owner-occupant, or who does not 
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reside in the City of Hazleton or within a ten (10) mile air 
radius of the City limits, shall appoint an Agent who shall 
reside in the City or within a ten (10) mile air radius of the 
City limits. 
SECTION 3. DUTIES OF THE OWNER AND/OR AGENT 
 
a. The Owner has the duty to maintain the Premises in good 
repair, clean and sanitary condition, and to maintain the 
Premises in compliance with the current Codes, Building 
Codes and Zoning Ordinance of the City of Hazleton. The 
Owner may delegate implementation of these responsibilities 
to an Agent.  
 
b. The duties of the Owner and/or Agent shall be to receive 
notices and correspondence, including service of process, 
from the City of Hazleton; to arrange for the inspection of the 
Rental Units; do or arrange for the performance of 
maintenance, cleaning, repair, pest control, snow and ice 
removal, and ensure continued compliance of the Premises 
with the current Codes, Building Codes and Zoning 
Ordinance in effect in the City of Hazleton, as well as arrange 
for garbage removal. 
 
c. The name, address and telephone number of the Owner and 
Agent, if applicable, shall be reported to the Code 
Enforcement Office in writing upon registering the Rental 
Units. 
 
d. No Dwelling Unit shall be occupied, knowingly by the 
Owner or Agent, by a number of persons that is in excess of 
the requirements outlined in 2003 International Property 
Maintenance Code, Chapter 4, Light, Ventilation, and 
Occupancy Limits, Section PM-404.5, Overcrowding, or any 
update thereof, a copy of which is appended hereto and made 
a part hereof. 
SECTION 4. NOTICES 
 
a. Whenever an Inspector or Code Enforcement Officer 
determines that any Rental Unit or Premises fails to meet the 
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requirements set forth in the applicable Codes, the Inspector 
or Code Enforcement Officer shall  issue a correction notice 
setting forth the violations and ordering the Occupant, Owner 
or Agent, as appropriate, to correct such violations. The 
notice shall: 
 
1) Be in writing; 
2) Describe the location and nature of the violation; 
3) Establish a reasonable time for the correction of the 
violation. 
 
b. All notices shall be served upon the Occupant, Owner or 
Agent, as applicable, personally or by certified mail, return 
receipt requested. A copy of any notices served solely on an 
Occupant shall also be provided to the Owner or Agent. In the 
event service is first attempted by mail and the notice is 
returned by the postal authorities marked “unclaimed” or 
“refused”, then the Code Enforcement Office or Police 
Department shall attempt delivery by personal service on the 
Occupant, Owner or Agent, as applicable. The Code 
Enforcement Office shall also post the notice at a conspicuous 
place on the Premises. If personal service directed to the 
Owner or Agent cannot be accomplished after a reasonable 
attempt to do so, then the notice may be sent to the Owner or 
Agent, as applicable, at the address stated on the most current 
registration application for the Premises in question, by 
regular first class mail, postage prepaid. If such notice is not 
returned by the postal authorities within five (5) days of its 
deposit in the U.S. Mail, then it shall be deemed to have been 
delivered to and received by the addressee on the fifth day 
following its deposit in the United States Mail. 
 
c. For purposes of this Ordinance, any notice hereunder that is 
given to the Agent shall be deemed as notice given to the 
Owner. 
 
d. There shall be a rebuttable presumption that any notice that 
is given to the Occupant, Owner or Agent under this 
ordinance shall have been received by such Occupant, Owner 
or Agent if the notice was served in the manner provided by 
this ordinance. 
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e. Subject to paragraph 4.d above, a claimed lack of 
knowledge by the Owner or Agent, if applicable, of any 
violation hereunder cited shall be no defense to closure of 
rental units pursuant to Section 9, as long as all notices 
prerequisite to such proceedings have been given and deemed 
received in accordance with the provisions of this ordinance. 
 
f. All notices shall contain a reasonable time to correct, or 
take steps to correct, violations of the above. The Occupant, 
Owner or Agent to whom the notice was addressed may 
request additional time to correct violations. Requests for 
additional time must be in writing and either deposited in the 
U.S. Mail (post-marked) or handdelivered to the Code 
Enforcement Office within five (5) days of receipt of the 
notice by the Occupant, Owner or Agent. The City retains the 
right to deny or modify time extension requests. If the 
Occupant, Owner or Agent is attempting in good faith to 
correct violations but is unable to do so within the time 
specified in the notice, the Occupant, Owner or Agent shall 
have the right to request such additional time as may be 
needed to complete the correction work, which request shall 
not be unreasonably withheld. 
 
g. Failure to correct violations within the time period stated in 
the notice of violation shall result in such actions or penalties 
as are set forth in Section 10 of this ordinance. If the notice of 
violation relates to actions or omissions of the Occupant, and 
the Occupant fails to make the necessary correction, the 
Owner or Agent may be required to remedy the condition. No 
adverse action shall be taken against an Owner or Agent for 
failure to remedy a condition so long as the Owner or Agent 
is acting with due diligence and taking bona fide steps to 
correct the violation, including but not limited to pursuing 
remedies under a lease agreement with an Occupant or 
Tenant. The City shall not be precluded from pursuing an 
enforcement action against any Occupant or Tenant who is 
deemed to be in violation. 
SECTION 5. INSURANCE 
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In order to protect the health, safety and welfare of the 
residents of the City, it is hereby declared that the city shall 
require hazard and general liability insurance for all property 
owners letting property for occupancy in the City. 
 
a. Minimum coverage; use of insurance proceeds. All Owners 
shall be required to obtain a minimum of fifty thousand 
($50,000.00) dollars in general liability insurance, and hazard 
and casualty insurance in an amount sufficient to either 
restore or remove the building in the event of a fire or other 
casualty. Further, in the event of any fire or loss covered by 
such insurance, it shall be the obligation of the Owner to use 
such insurance proceeds to cause the restoration or demolition 
or other repair of the property in adherence to the City Code 
and all applicable ordinances. 
 
b. Property owners to provide City with insurance 
information. Owners shall be required to place their insurance 
company name, policy number and policy expiration date on 
their Rental Property Registration form, or in the alternative, 
to provide the Code Enforcement Office with a copy of a 
certificate of insurance. A registration Certificate (see Section 
6 below) shall not be issued to any Owner or Agent unless the 
aforementioned information has been provided to the Code 
Enforcement Office. The Code Enforcement Office shall be 
informed of any change in policies for a particular rental 
property or cancellation of a policy for said property within 
thirty (30) days of said change or cancellation. 
SECTION 6. RENTAL REGISTRATION AND LICENSE 
REQUIREMENTS 
 
a. No Person shall hereafter occupy, allow to be occupied, 
advertise for occupancy, solicit occupants for, or let to 
another person for occupancy any Rental Unit within the City 
for which an application for license has not been made and 
filed with the Code Enforcement Office and for which there is 
not an effective license. Initial application and renewal shall 
be made upon forms furnished by the Code Enforcement 
Office for such purpose and shall specifically require the 
following minimum information: 
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1) Name, mailing address, street address and phone 
number of the Owner, and if the Owner is not a natural 
person, the name, address and phone number of a 
designated representative of the Owner. 
2) Name, mailing address, street address and phone 
number of the Agent of the Owner, if applicable. 
3) The street address of the Premises being registered. 
4) The number and types of units within the Premises 
(Dwelling Units or Rooming Units) The Owner or Agent 
shall notify the Code Enforcement Office of any changes 
of the above information within thirty (30) days of such 
change. 
 
b. The initial application for registration and licensing shall 
be made by personally filing an application with the Code 
Enforcement Office by November 1, 2006. Thereafter, any 
new applicant shall file an application before the Premises is 
let for occupancy, or within thirty (30) days of becoming an 
Owner of a currently registered Premises. One application per 
property is required, as each property will receive its own 
license. 
 
c. Upon receipt of the initial application or any renewal 
thereof and the payment of applicable fees as set forth in 
Section 7 below, the Code Enforcement Office shall issue a 
Rental Registration License to the Owner within thirty (30) 
days of receipt of payment. 
 
d. Each new license issued hereunder, and each renewal 
license, shall expire on October 31 of each year. The Code 
Enforcement Office shall mail license renewal applications to 
the Owner or designated Agent on or before September 1 of 
each year. Renewal applications and fees may be returned by 
mail or in person to the Code Enforcement Office. A renewal 
license will not be issued unless the application and 
appropriate fee has been remitted. 
SECTION 7. FEES. 
 
a. Annual License Fee. There shall be a license fee for the 
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initial license and an annual renewal fee thereafter. Fees shall 
be assessed against and payable by the Owner in the amount 
of $5.00 per Rental Unit, payable at the time of initial 
registration and annual renewal, as more specifically set forth 
in Section 6 above. 
 
b. Occupancy Permit Fee. There shall be a one-time 
occupancy permit fee of $10.00 for every new Occupant, 
which is payable by the Occupant. For purposes of initial 
registration under this ordinance, this fee shall be paid for all 
current Occupants by November 1, 2006. Thereafter, prior to 
occupying any Rental Unit, all Occupants shall obtain an 
occupancy permit. It shall be the Occupant‟s responsibility to 
submit an occupancy permit application to the Code 
Enforcement Office, pay the fee and obtain the occupancy 
permit. If there are multiple Occupants in a single Rental 
Unit, each Occupant shall obtain his or her own permit. 
Owner or Agent shall notify all prospective Occupants of this 
requirement and shall not permit occupancy of a Rental Unit 
unless the Occupant first obtains an occupancy permit. Each 
occupancy permit issued is valid only for the Occupant for as 
long as the Occupant continues to occupy the Rental Unit for 
which such permit was applied. Any relocation to a different 
Rental Unit requires a new occupancy permit. All Occupants 
age 65 and older, with adequate proof of age, shall be exempt 
from paying the permit fee, but shall be otherwise required to 
comply with this section and the rest of the Ordinance.  
 
1. Application for occupancy permits shall be made upon 
forms furnished by the Code Enforcement Office for such 
purpose and shall specifically require the following 
minimum information: 
a) Name of Occupant 
b) Mailing address of Occupant 
c) Street address of Rental Unit for which Occupant is 
applying, if different from mailing address 
d) Name of Landlord 
e) Date of lease commencement 
f) Proof of age if claiming exemption from the permit 
fee 
g) Proper identification showing proof of legal 
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citizenship and/or residency 
2. Upon receipt of the application and the payment of 
applicable fees as set forth above, the Code Enforcement 
Office shall issue an Occupancy Permit to the Occupant 
immediately. 
SECTION 8. ENFORCEMENT 
 
a. The following persons are hereby authorized to enforce this 
Ordinance: 
 
1. The Chief of Police 
2. Any Police Officer 
3. Code Enforcement Officer 
4. The Fire Chief 
5. Deputy Fire Chief of the City of Hazleton. 
6. Health Officer 
7. Director of Public Works 
 
b. The designation of any person to enforce this Ordinance or 
authorization of an Inspector, when in writing, and signed by 
a person authorized by Section 8.a to designate or authorize 
an Inspector to enforce this Ordinance, shall be prima facie 
evidence of such authority before the Magisterial District 
Judge, Court of Common Pleas, or any other Court, 
administrative body of the City, or of this commonwealth, 
and the designating Director or Supervisor need not be called 
as a witness thereto. 
SECTION 9. FAILURE TO CORRECT VIOLATIONS. 
 
If any Person shall fail, refuse or neglect to comply with a 
notice of violation as set forth in Section 4 above, the City 
shall have the right to file an enforcement action with the 
Magisterial District Judge against any Person the City deems 
to be in violation. If, after hearing, the Magisterial District 
Judge determines that such Person or Persons are in violation, 
the Magisterial District Judge may, at the City‟s request, 
order the closure of the Rental Unit(s), or assess fines in 
accordance with Section 10 below, until such violations are 
corrected. Such order shall be stayed pending any appeal to 
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the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County. 
SECTION 10. FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THIS 
ORDINANCE; PENALTIES 
 
a. Except as provided in subsections 10.b and 10.c below, any 
Person who shall violate any provision of the Ordinance shall, 
upon conviction thereof after notice and a hearing before the 
Magisterial District Judge, be sentenced to pay a fine of not 
less than $100.00 and not more than $300.00 plus costs, or 
imprisonment for a term not to exceed ninety (90) days in 
default of payment. Every day that a violation of this 
Ordinance continues shall constitute a separate offense, 
provided, however, that failure to register or renew or pay 
appropriate fees in a timely manner shall not constitute a 
continuing offense but shall be a single offense not subject to 
daily fines. 
 
b. Any Owner or Agent who shall allow any Occupant to 
occupy a Rental Unit without first obtaining an occupancy 
permit is in violation of Section 7.b and shall, upon 
conviction thereof after notice and a hearing before the 
Magisterial District Judge, be sentenced to pay a fine of 
$1,000 for each Occupant that does not have an occupancy 
permit and $100 per Occupant per day for each day that 
Owner or Agent continues to allow each such Occupant to 
occupy the Rental Unit without an occupancy permit after 
Owner or Agent is given notice of such violation pursuant to 
Section 4 above. Owner or Agent shall not be held liable for 
the actions of Occupants who allow additional occupancy in 
any Rental Unit without the Owner or Agent‟s written 
permission, provided that Owner or Agent takes reasonable 
steps to remove or register such unauthorized Occupant(s) 
within ten (10) days of learning of their unauthorized 
occupancy in the Rental Unit. 
 
c. Any Occupant having an occupancy permit but who allows 
additional occupancy in a Rental Unit without first obtaining 
the written permission of the Owner or Agent and without 
requiring each such additional Occupant to obtain his or her 
own occupancy permit is in violation of Section 7.b of this 
  
 
71 
ordinance and shall, upon conviction thereof after notice and 
a hearing before the Magisterial District Judge, be sentenced 
to pay a fine of $1,000 for each additional Occupant 
permitted by Occupant that does not have an occupancy 
permit and $100 per additional Occupant per day for each day 
that Occupant continues to allow each such additional 
Occupant to occupy the Rental Unit without an occupancy 
permit after Occupant is given written notice of such violation 
by Owner or Agent or pursuant to Section 4 above. 
SECTION 11. APPLICABILITY AND EXEMPTIONS TO 
THE ORDINANCE 
 
The provisions of the ordinance shall not apply to the 
following properties, which are exempt from registration and 
license requirements: 
 
a. Hotels, Motels and Dormitories. 
 
b. Rental Units owned by Public Authorities as defined under 
the Pennsylvania Municipal Authorities Act, and Dwelling 
Units that are part of an elderly housing multi-unit building 
which is 75% occupied by individuals over the age of sixty-
five. 
 
c. Multi-dwelling units that operate under Internal Revenue 
Service Code Section 42 concerning entities that operate with 
an elderly component. 
 
d. Properties which consist of a double home, half of which is 
let for occupancy and half of which is Owner-occupied as the 
Owner‟s residence. 
SECTION 12. CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION 
 
All registration information collected by the City under this 
Ordinance shall be maintained as confidential and shall not be 
disseminated or released to any individual, group or 
organization for any purpose except as provided herein or 
required by law. Information may be released only to 
authorized individuals when required during the course of an 
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official City, state or federal investigation or inquiry. 
SECTION 13. SAVINGS CLAUSE 
 
This ordinance shall not affect violations of any other 
ordinance, code or regulation existing prior to the effective 
date thereof and any such violations shall be governed and 
shall continue to be punishable to the full extent of the law 
under the provisions of those ordinances, codes or regulations 
in effect at the time the violation was committed. 
SECTION 14. SEVERABILITY 
 
If any section, clause, provision or portion of this Ordinance 
shall be held invalid or unconstitutional by any Court of 
competent jurisdiction, such decision shall not affect any 
other section, clause, provision or portion of this Ordinance 
so long as it remains legally enforceable without the invalid 
portion. The City reserves the right to amend this Ordinance 
or any portion thereof from time to time as it shall deem 
advisable in the best interest of the promotion of the purposes 
and intent of this Ordinance, and the effective administration 
thereof. 
SECTION 15. EFFECTIVE DATE 
 
This Ordinance shall become effective immediately upon 
approval. This Ordinance repeals Ordinance number 2004-11 
and replaces same in its entirety. 
SECTION 16. 
 
This Ordinance is enacted by the Council of the City of 
Hazleton under the authority of the Act of Legislature, April 
13, 1972, Act No. 62, known as the “Home Rule Charter and 
Optional Plans Law”, and all other laws enforceable the State 
of Pennsylvania. 
